21sort to some complex variant of l

21

sort to some complex variant of laws of the first sort. The effort to show that laws conferring rights are “really" only conditional stipulations of sanctions to be exacted from the person ultimately under a legal duty characterizes much of Kelsen's work. Yet to urge this is really just to exhibit dogmatic determination to suppress one aspect of the legal system in order to maintain the theory that the stipulation of a sanction, like Austin's command, represents the quintessence of law. One might as well urge that the rules of baseball were "really" only complex conditional directions to the scorer and that this showed their real or "essential" nature.
One of the first jurists in England to break with the Austinian tradition, Salmond, complained that the analysis in terms of commands left the notion of a right unprovided with a place. But he confused the point. He argued first, and correctly, that if laws are merely commands it is inexplicable that we should have come to speak of legal rights and powers as conferred or arising under them, but then wrongly concluded that the rules of a legal system must necessarily be connected with moral rules or principles of justice and that only on this footing could the phenomenon of legal rights be explained. Otherwise, Salmond thought, we would have to say that a mere "verbal coincidence" connects the concepts of legal and moral right. Similarly, continental critics of the Utilitarians, always alive to the complexity of the notion of a subjective right, insisted that the command theory gave it no place. Hagerstrom insisted that if laws were merely commands the notion of an individual's right was really inexplicable, for commands are, as he said, something which we either obey or we do not obey; they do not confer rights. But he, too, concluded that moral, or, as he put it, common-sense, notions of justice must therefore be necessarily involved in the analysis of any legal structure elaborate enough to confer rights.
Yet, surely these arguments are confused. Rules that confer rights, though distinct from commands, need not be moral rules or coincide with them. Rights, after all, exist under the rules of ceremonies, games, and in many other spheres regulated by rules which are irrelevant to the question of justice or what the law ought to be. Nor need rules which confer rights be just or













22

morally good rules. The rights of a master over his slaves show us that. "Their merit or demerit," as Austin termed it, depends on how rights are distributed in society and over whom or what they are exercised. These critics indeed revealed the inadequacy of the simple notions of command and habit for the analysis of law; at many points it is apparent that the social acceptance of a rule or standard of authority (even if it is motivated only by fear or superstition or rests on inertia) must be brought into the analysis and cannot itself be reduced to the two simple terms. Yet nothing in this showed the utilitarian insistence on the distinction between the existence of law and its "merits" to be wrong.

II

I now turn to a distinctively American criticism of the separation of the law that is from the law that ought to be. It emerged from the critical study of the judicial process with which American jurisprudence has been on the whole so beneficially occupied. The most skeptical of these critics-the loosely named "Realists" of the 1930's-perhaps too naively accepted the conceptual framework of the natural sciences as adequate for the characterization of law and for the analysis of rule-guided action of which a living system of law at least partly consists. But they opened men's eyes to what actually goes on when courts decide cases, and the contrast they drew between the actual facts of judicial decision and the traditional terminology for describing it as if it were a wholly logical operation was usually illuminating; for in spite of some exaggeration the "Realists" made us acutely conscious of one cardinal feature of human language and human thought, emphasis on which is vital not only for the understanding of law but in areas of philosophy far beyond the confines of jurisprudence. The insight of this school may be presented in the following example. A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these, as we say to be called "vehicles" for the purpose of the rule or not? If we are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the most elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that a certain type of behavior be regulated by rules, then the general words we use-like "vehicle" in the case I consider-must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its application. There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out. These cases will each have some features in common with the standard case; they will lack others or be accompanied by features not present in the standard case. Human invention and natural processes continually throw up such variants on the familiar,




23

and if we are to say that these ranges of facts do or do not fall under existing rules, then the classifier must make a decision which is not dictated to him, for the facts and phenomena to which we fit our words and apply our rules are as it were dumb. The toy automobile cannot speak up and say, "I am a vehicle for the purpose of this legal rule," nor can the roller skates chorus, "We are not a vehicle." Fact situations do not await us neatly labeled, creased, and folded, nor is their legal classification written on them to be simply read off by the judge.
Instead, in applying legal rules, someone must take the responsibility of deciding that words do or do not cover some case in hand with all the practical consequences involved in this decision.
We may call the problems which arise outside the hard core of standard instances or settled meaning "problems of the penumbra"; they are always with us whether in relation to such trivial things as the regulation of the use of the public park or in relation to the multidimensional generalities of a constitution. If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their application to specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical deduction, and so deductive reasoning, which for generations has been cherished as the very perfection of human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what judges, or indeed anyone, should do in bringing particular cases under general rules. In this area men cannot live by deduction alone. And it follows that if legal arguments and legal decisions of penumbral questions are to be rational, their rationality must lie in something other than a logical relation to premises. So if it is rational or "sound" to argue and to decide that for the purposes of this rule an airplane is not a vehicle, this argument must be sound or rational without being logically conclusive. What is it then that makes such decisions correct or at least better than alternative decisions? Again, it seems true to say that the criterion which makes a decision sound in such cases is some concept of what the law ought to be; it is easy to slide from that into saying that it must be a moral judgment about what law ought to be. So here we touch upon a point of necessary "intersection between law and morals" which demonstrates the falsity or, at any rate, the misleading character of the Utilitarians' emphatic insistence on the separation of law as it is and ought to be. Surely, Bentham and Austin could only have written as they did because they misunderstood or neglected this aspect of the judicial process, because they ignored the problems of the penumbra.
The misconception of the judicial process which ignores the problems of the penumbra and which views the process as consisting preeminently in deductive reasoning is often stigmatized as the error of "formalism" or "literalism." My question now is, how and to what extent does the demonstration of this error show the utilitarian distinction to be wrong or misleading? Here

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 1:

21เรียงลำดับไปบางตัวแปรที่ซับซ้อนของกฎของการเรียงลำดับแรก ความพยายามในการแสดง conferring สิทธิกฎหมายจะลงโทษเพื่อจะได้เรียกร้องเอาจากบุคคลเฉพาะเงื่อนไข stipulations "จริงๆ" ที่สุดภายใต้หน้าที่ระบุลักษณะของงานของ Kelsen ยัง ชวนนี้ได้แค่แสดงนา ๆ กำหนดจะระงับแง่มุมหนึ่งของระบบกฎหมายเพื่อรักษาทฤษฎีว่า stipulation ของตัวไป เช่นคำสั่งของ Austin แสดงถึงการพบของกฎหมาย หนึ่งอาจรวมทั้งกระตุ้นให้ว่า กฎของเบสบอลได้ "จริงๆ" เท่านั้นซับซ้อนมีเงื่อนไขคำแนะนำที่ scorer และว่า นี้แสดงให้เห็นธรรมชาติของพวกเขาจริง หรือ "จำเป็น"One of the first jurists in England to break with the Austinian tradition, Salmond, complained that the analysis in terms of commands left the notion of a right unprovided with a place. But he confused the point. He argued first, and correctly, that if laws are merely commands it is inexplicable that we should have come to speak of legal rights and powers as conferred or arising under them, but then wrongly concluded that the rules of a legal system must necessarily be connected with moral rules or principles of justice and that only on this footing could the phenomenon of legal rights be explained. Otherwise, Salmond thought, we would have to say that a mere "verbal coincidence" connects the concepts of legal and moral right. Similarly, continental critics of the Utilitarians, always alive to the complexity of the notion of a subjective right, insisted that the command theory gave it no place. Hagerstrom insisted that if laws were merely commands the notion of an individual's right was really inexplicable, for commands are, as he said, something which we either obey or we do not obey; they do not confer rights. But he, too, concluded that moral, or, as he put it, common-sense, notions of justice must therefore be necessarily involved in the analysis of any legal structure elaborate enough to confer rights.Yet, surely these arguments are confused. Rules that confer rights, though distinct from commands, need not be moral rules or coincide with them. Rights, after all, exist under the rules of ceremonies, games, and in many other spheres regulated by rules which are irrelevant to the question of justice or what the law ought to be. Nor need rules which confer rights be just or 22morally good rules. The rights of a master over his slaves show us that. "Their merit or demerit," as Austin termed it, depends on how rights are distributed in society and over whom or what they are exercised. These critics indeed revealed the inadequacy of the simple notions of command and habit for the analysis of law; at many points it is apparent that the social acceptance of a rule or standard of authority (even if it is motivated only by fear or superstition or rests on inertia) must be brought into the analysis and cannot itself be reduced to the two simple terms. Yet nothing in this showed the utilitarian insistence on the distinction between the existence of law and its "merits" to be wrong.III now turn to a distinctively American criticism of the separation of the law that is from the law that ought to be. It emerged from the critical study of the judicial process with which American jurisprudence has been on the whole so beneficially occupied. The most skeptical of these critics-the loosely named "Realists" of the 1930's-perhaps too naively accepted the conceptual framework of the natural sciences as adequate for the characterization of law and for the analysis of rule-guided action of which a living system of law at least partly consists. But they opened men's eyes to what actually goes on when courts decide cases, and the contrast they drew between the actual facts of judicial decision and the traditional terminology for describing it as if it were a wholly logical operation was usually illuminating; for in spite of some exaggeration the "Realists" made us acutely conscious of one cardinal feature of human language and human thought, emphasis on which is vital not only for the understanding of law but in areas of philosophy far beyond the confines of jurisprudence. The insight of this school may be presented in the following example. A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these, as we say to be called "vehicles" for the purpose of the rule or not? If we are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the most elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that a certain type of behavior be regulated by rules, then the general words we use-like "vehicle" in the case I consider-must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its application. There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out. These cases will each have some features in common with the standard case; they will lack others or be accompanied by features not present in the standard case. Human invention and natural processes continually throw up such variants on the familiar, 23and if we are to say that these ranges of facts do or do not fall under existing rules, then the classifier must make a decision which is not dictated to him, for the facts and phenomena to which we fit our words and apply our rules are as it were dumb. The toy automobile cannot speak up and say, "I am a vehicle for the purpose of this legal rule," nor can the roller skates chorus, "We are not a vehicle." Fact situations do not await us neatly labeled, creased, and folded, nor is their legal classification written on them to be simply read off by the judge.Instead, in applying legal rules, someone must take the responsibility of deciding that words do or do not cover some case in hand with all the practical consequences involved in this decision.We may call the problems which arise outside the hard core of standard instances or settled meaning "problems of the penumbra"; they are always with us whether in relation to such trivial things as the regulation of the use of the public park or in relation to the multidimensional generalities of a constitution. If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their application to specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical deduction, and so deductive reasoning, which for generations has been cherished as the very perfection of human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what judges, or indeed anyone, should do in bringing particular cases under general rules. In this area men cannot live by deduction alone. And it follows that if legal arguments and legal decisions of penumbral questions are to be rational, their rationality must lie in something other than a logical relation to premises. So if it is rational or "sound" to argue and to decide that for the purposes of this rule an airplane is not a vehicle, this argument must be sound or rational without being logically conclusive. What is it then that makes such decisions correct or at least better than alternative decisions? Again, it seems true to say that the criterion which makes a decision sound in such cases is some concept of what the law ought to be; it is easy to slide from that into saying that it must be a moral judgment about what law ought to be. So here we touch upon a point of necessary "intersection between law and morals" which demonstrates the falsity or, at any rate, the misleading character of the Utilitarians' emphatic insistence on the separation of law as it is and ought to be. Surely, Bentham and Austin could only have written as they did because they misunderstood or neglected this aspect of the judicial process, because they ignored the problems of the penumbra.The misconception of the judicial process which ignores the problems of the penumbra and which views the process as consisting preeminently in deductive reasoning is often stigmatized as the error of "formalism" or "literalism." My question now is, how and to what extent does the demonstration of this error show the utilitarian distinction to be wrong or misleading? Here

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 3:

21

เรียงบางซับซ้อนแตกต่างจากกฎหมายแรกของการจัดเรียง ความพยายามที่จะแสดงให้เห็นว่ากฎหมายปรึกษาฯ " จริงๆ " เท่านั้นเงื่อนไขข้อกําหนดการจะทำการจากบุคคลในที่สุดภายใต้กฎหมายกำหนดลักษณะของเคลเซนงานแต่เกณฑ์นี้เป็นเพียงการจัดแสดงการดันทุรังที่จะปราบปรามแง่มุมหนึ่งของระบบกฎหมายเพื่อรักษาทฤษฎีว่าการลงโทษ เช่น ออสติน เป็นคำสั่ง เป็นแก่นสารของกฎหมายหนึ่งอาจจะขอให้ที่กติกาเบสบอล " จริงๆ " ที่ซับซ้อนที่มีเงื่อนไขเส้นทางประตูและที่พบจริงหรือ " จำเป็น " ธรรมชาติ .
หนึ่งในลูกขุนครั้งแรกในอังกฤษจะแบ่งกับประเพณีแซลเมินด์ austinian , บ่นว่า , การวิเคราะห์ในแง่ของการสั่งทิ้งความคิดของสิทธิ unprovided กับสถานที่ แต่เขาสับสนประเด็น เขาแย้งก่อนและถูกต้องว่า ถ้ากฎหมายเป็นเพียงคำสั่งมันอธิบายไม่ได้ว่าเราน่าจะมาพูดของสิทธิตามกฎหมายและอำนาจเป็นชื่อย่อหรือที่เกิดขึ้นภายใต้พวกเขา แต่แล้ว ผิด สรุปได้ว่า กฎของระบบกฎหมายจะต้องเชื่อมต่อกับกฎทางศีลธรรมหรือหลักการของความยุติธรรมและมีเพียงบนฐานรากนี้ปรากฏการณ์ของสิทธิ กฎหมายสามารถอธิบายได้ มิฉะนั้นแซลเมินด์คิด เราก็ต้องบอกว่า เป็นแค่ " วาจาบังเอิญ " เชื่อมต่อแนวคิดของกฎหมายและจริยธรรมที่ถูกต้อง ในทำนองเดียวกัน , คอนติเนนนักวิจารณ์ของ utilitarians มักจะมีชีวิตอยู่เพื่อความซับซ้อนของความคิดขวา อัตนัย ยืนยันว่าทฤษฎีคำสั่งให้มันไม่มีที่hagerstrom ยืนยันว่า ถ้ากฎหมายเป็นคำสั่งของความคิดของแต่ละคนใช่ก็อธิบายไม่ได้จริงๆ สําหรับคําสั่งที่เขากล่าวว่าสิ่งที่เราให้ทำตาม หรือเราไม่ทำตาม พวกเขาไม่ได้ให้สิทธิ แต่เขาก็สรุปได้ว่า คุณธรรม หรือที่เขาเรียกว่า สามัญสำนึกความคิดของความยุติธรรมจึงต้องจําเป็นต้องมีส่วนร่วมในการวิเคราะห์โครงสร้างทางกฎหมายใด ๆที่ซับซ้อนเพียงพอที่จะให้สิทธิ .
แต่แน่นอนอาร์กิวเมนต์เหล่านี้จะสับสน กฎที่ให้สิทธิ แต่แตกต่างจากคำสั่งไม่ต้องมีกฎทางศีลธรรมหรือตรงกับพวกเขา สิทธิมนุษยชน หลังจากทั้งหมด อยู่ภายใต้กฎของพิธี , เกมและในหลาย ๆทรงกลมควบคุมโดยกฎซึ่งไม่เกี่ยวข้องกับคำถามของความยุติธรรมหรือกฎหมายที่ควรจะเป็น หรือต้องมีกฎที่ให้สิทธิเป็นเพียงหรือ













22

ความดีทางศีลธรรมกฏ สิทธิของอาจารย์มากกว่าทาสของเขาแสดงให้เราดู " บุญหรือบาปของพวกเขา , " ออสตินว่ามันขึ้นอยู่กับว่ามีการกระจายในสังคม และสิทธิเหนือใคร หรือ อะไรที่พวกเขาใช้ .นักวิจารณ์เหล่านี้จริงๆพบความไม่เพียงพอของความคิดที่เรียบง่ายของคำสั่งและนิสัยการวิเคราะห์กฎหมาย หลายจุดมันชัดเจนว่าสังคมให้การยอมรับกฎหรือมาตรฐานของผู้มีอำนาจ ( แม้ว่ามันจะมีแค่ความกลัว หรือ ไสยศาสตร์ หรือขึ้นอยู่กับความเฉื่อย ) จะต้องนำมาวิเคราะห์และไม่สามารถตัวเองจะลดลง ไปง่ายๆสองเงื่อนไขแต่ไม่มีอะไรในการเรียกร้องประโยชน์ต่อความแตกต่างระหว่างการดำรงอยู่ของกฎหมายของ " บุญ " ที่จะผิด

ii

ตอนนี้ผมจะวิจารณ์อย่างเด่นชัดของชาวอเมริกันในการแยกกฎหมายที่เป็นกฎหมายที่ควรจะเป็น มันโผล่ออกมาจากการศึกษาที่สําคัญของกระบวนการตุลาการที่อเมริกันนิติศาสตร์ได้รับทั้งเพื่อประโยชน์ครอบครอง