A political philosophy that makes room for contingency and
undecidability is clearly at odds with liberal rationalism, whose typical
move is to erase its very conditions of enunciation and deny its
historical space of inscription. This was already constitutive of the
'hypocrisy' of the Enlightenment, as Reinhart Koselleck has shown.
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Many liberals follow suit by refusing to assume their political stand and
pretending to be speaking from an impartial location. In that way they
manage to present their views as the embodiment of 'rationality' and
this enables them to exclude their opponents from 'rational dialogue'.
However, the excluded do not disappear and, once their position has
been declared 'unreasonable', the problem of neutrality remains
unsolved. From their point of view, the 'neutral' principles of rational
dialogue are certainly not so. For them, what is proclaimed as
'rationality' by the liberals is experienced as coercion.