e obtain the sample of open-market stock repurchase announcements from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database. Our sample of repurchase announcements spans from January 1988 through December 2010. Following Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Lie (2005), we exclude repurchase announcements from regulated firms, i.e., utilities and financial firms. We also exclude repurchases with announced values of less than one million dollars. Following Guay and Harford (2000), we only retain the first announcement if a firm has more than one announcement in a fiscal year, since the subsequent announcements are more likely duplicate announcements. Repurchase firms need to have data for computing returns at least one year after the announcement (Center for Research in Security Prices) and have sufficient data for accounting variables (from Standard and Poor’s Compustat). Our final sample has 6,311 repurchase announcements from 2,854 firms.
Following Yook (2010), we divide the repurchase announcement sample into repurchasing firms and non-repurchasing firms based on the actual repurchases made from the announcement quarter (t) through quarter t+4. Repurchases in each fiscal quarter are computed as Compustat data item PRSTKCY (purchase of common and preferred stock) less any decrease in preferred stock. Since PRDTKCY is a year-to-date item, we need to convert it to quarterly repurchases. Specifically, each quarterly repurchase, except the first quarter of the fiscal year, is equal to the PRDTKCY of the current quarter minus the PRDTKCY of the previous quarter. Preferred stock is estimated as, in order of preference, data item PSTKCY (redemption value), item PSTKL (liquidating value), or item PSTK (carrying value). We then obtain the total repurchases for the one-year period as the sum of repurchases from the announcement quarter (t) to quarter t+4. If a firm’s total repurchases for the one-year period are positive, we define the firm as a repurchasing firm and as a non-repurchasing firm otherwise.
In Table I, we present the distribution of the sample repurchase announcements by calendar years and by subsamples based on actual repurchases over a one-year period. The annual distribution of repurchase announcements is uneven throughout the sample period. In particular, more repurchase announcements occur in the late 1990s than in other periods. According to our definition of actual repurchases, 4,603 repurchase announcement firms or 72.9 percent of the entire sample are considered repurchasing firms, which is consistent with Yook (2010).
Table II presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of repurchase announcement firms as well as for the two subsamples defined by actual repurchases. Size is measured as the market value of equity in the month before the repurchase announcement. On average, the repurchasing firms are larger than non-repurchasing firms. The repurchasing firms also have a higher B/M value of equity ratio than that of the non-repurchasing firms, suggesting that repurchasing firms are more undervalued compared to the non-repurchasing firms. This is intuitive and consistent with the most cited reason for repurchase, which is undervaluation. EarningsΔ is the percentage change in earnings before extraordinary items (IB in COMPUSTAT) in the announcement year relative to the prior year. Table II shows that, on average, repurchasing firms exhibit higher EarningsΔ in the announcement year compared to non-repurchasing firms. Performance is measured as the monthly compounded return for 12 months before the repurchase announcement month. The mean prior return of repurchasing firms is 9 percent, as compared to 11 percent for non-repurchasing firms. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) find that the pre-announcement performance of repurchasing firms is negatively related to the post-announcement returns.
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that repurchasing firms experience a decrease in systematic risk after repurchase announcements. We measure the change in systematic risk (RiskΔ) as the β estimate for the [+30, +250] window minus the β estimate for the [−250, −30] window using the market model. We observe an average decrease of 0.09 and 0.10 in the systematic risk for repurchasing firms and for non-repurchasing firms, respectively. Real_RP is a dummy variable that receives a value of one if the firm actually repurchases stock and zero otherwise. As shown previously in Table I, 73 percent of the firms that announce repurchases actually proceed with implementing the repurchase. The three-day CAR [−1, +1] around the repurchase announcement is 2 percent, consistent with previous studies.
e ได้รับตัวอย่างประกาศเปิดตลาดหุ้นปรับจากฐานข้อมูลบริษัทข้อมูลบริษัทหลักทรัพย์ (SDC) ครอบงำและซื้อ ตัวอย่างของประกาศปรับเราขยายจาก 1988 มกราคมถึง 2553 ธันวาคม ต่อไปนี้ Ikenberry และ al. (1995) และนอน (2005), เราไม่รวมประกาศปรับจากบริษัทควบคุม เช่น สาธารณูปโภคและการเงินบริษัท นอกจากนี้เรายังแยก repurchases กับค่าที่กำหนดน้อยกว่าหนึ่งล้านดอลลาร์ ต่อก๋วยน้ำข้นและ Harford (2000), เราเพียงรักษาประกาศแรกถ้าบริษัทมีประกาศมากกว่าหนึ่งในปี ตั้งแต่ประกาศต่อมา ประกาศซ้ำยิ่ง ปรับบริษัทจำเป็นต้องมีข้อมูลสำหรับคอมพิวเตอร์คืนค่าอย่างน้อยหนึ่งปีหลังจากประกาศ (ศูนย์วิจัยความปลอดภัยราคา) และมีข้อมูลเพียงพอสำหรับตัวแปรการบัญชี (จากมาตรฐานและแย่ของ Compustat) ตัวอย่างสุดท้ายของเราได้ประกาศการปรับ 6,311 จากบริษัท 2,854Following Yook (2010), we divide the repurchase announcement sample into repurchasing firms and non-repurchasing firms based on the actual repurchases made from the announcement quarter (t) through quarter t+4. Repurchases in each fiscal quarter are computed as Compustat data item PRSTKCY (purchase of common and preferred stock) less any decrease in preferred stock. Since PRDTKCY is a year-to-date item, we need to convert it to quarterly repurchases. Specifically, each quarterly repurchase, except the first quarter of the fiscal year, is equal to the PRDTKCY of the current quarter minus the PRDTKCY of the previous quarter. Preferred stock is estimated as, in order of preference, data item PSTKCY (redemption value), item PSTKL (liquidating value), or item PSTK (carrying value). We then obtain the total repurchases for the one-year period as the sum of repurchases from the announcement quarter (t) to quarter t+4. If a firm’s total repurchases for the one-year period are positive, we define the firm as a repurchasing firm and as a non-repurchasing firm otherwise.In Table I, we present the distribution of the sample repurchase announcements by calendar years and by subsamples based on actual repurchases over a one-year period. The annual distribution of repurchase announcements is uneven throughout the sample period. In particular, more repurchase announcements occur in the late 1990s than in other periods. According to our definition of actual repurchases, 4,603 repurchase announcement firms or 72.9 percent of the entire sample are considered repurchasing firms, which is consistent with Yook (2010).Table II presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of repurchase announcement firms as well as for the two subsamples defined by actual repurchases. Size is measured as the market value of equity in the month before the repurchase announcement. On average, the repurchasing firms are larger than non-repurchasing firms. The repurchasing firms also have a higher B/M value of equity ratio than that of the non-repurchasing firms, suggesting that repurchasing firms are more undervalued compared to the non-repurchasing firms. This is intuitive and consistent with the most cited reason for repurchase, which is undervaluation. EarningsΔ is the percentage change in earnings before extraordinary items (IB in COMPUSTAT) in the announcement year relative to the prior year. Table II shows that, on average, repurchasing firms exhibit higher EarningsΔ in the announcement year compared to non-repurchasing firms. Performance is measured as the monthly compounded return for 12 months before the repurchase announcement month. The mean prior return of repurchasing firms is 9 percent, as compared to 11 percent for non-repurchasing firms. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) find that the pre-announcement performance of repurchasing firms is negatively related to the post-announcement returns.Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that repurchasing firms experience a decrease in systematic risk after repurchase announcements. We measure the change in systematic risk (RiskΔ) as the β estimate for the [+30, +250] window minus the β estimate for the [−250, −30] window using the market model. We observe an average decrease of 0.09 and 0.10 in the systematic risk for repurchasing firms and for non-repurchasing firms, respectively. Real_RP is a dummy variable that receives a value of one if the firm actually repurchases stock and zero otherwise. As shown previously in Table I, 73 percent of the firms that announce repurchases actually proceed with implementing the repurchase. The three-day CAR [−1, +1] around the repurchase announcement is 2 percent, consistent with previous studies.
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