wang et al. make both an empirical and conceptual to the knowledge-based view of the firm. they do this by developing hypotheses that address some significant gaps in knowledge and then testing them empirically. the gap in knowledge they address is the extent to which different governance mechanisms motivate worker to contribute to the development of organization-specific knowledge resources. this is neglected topic as the literature on the resource/knowledge-based view of the firm typically doesn't question or address the issue of employee motivation, generally assuming that such motivation is un problematic.
wang et al. argue that, in line with the knowledge-based view of the firm, the development of firm-specific knowledge is likely to benefit the firm. future,they argue that the development of such knowledge does not happen automatically,and is dependent on the activity of key organizational employees. however, they argue that worker may not necessarily be willing to invest the effort necessary to development this knowledge. this is because contributing to the development to firm-specific resources does little to improve the marketability of worker in external labour markets, as the firm-specific knowledge they are contributing to the development of has limited relevance and transferability beyond the firm. the main way in which employees can benefit from the development of such knowledge is via being rewarded by their employer. if workers have concerns regarding whether they will be adequately rewarded by their employer for such effort they may be unwilling to contribute to the development of firm-specific knowledge resources. thus,for firms to ensure that their workers are willing to contribute to the development of such resources,they need to motivate them to do so. wang et al. investigate the extent to which two different governance mechanisms were able to provide this motivation.
the governance mechanisms they examined were economic(rewarding employees by given them some company stocks and shares) and relationship-based (developing long-term employee loyalty to the firm). in relation to rewarding employees via giving them company stock, this is argued to help align the interests of the employee with that of the company. thus it is hypothesized that there will be a positive relationship between levels of organization-specific knowledge and the provision of this type of economic governance mechanism. another way in which to align the interests of the employee and the company is via the development of employee trust and loyalty in the firm. wang et al.argue that such trust and loyalty can be development via providing long-term employment policies. they hypothesize that there will be a positive relationship between the provision of such resources, and the levels of firm-specific knowledge a firm possesses.
the hypotheses were tested via the analysis of data that were collected from arange of different databases, but were restricted to manufacturing companies in the usa. the composite dataset that was developed contained information on 211 companies. the existence of fire-specific knowledge was measured via looking at patent data and counting the number of self-citations in patent applications. it was assumed that, if a patent application include citations of other company patent applications. it evidence of the development of firm-specific knowledge,which is developed cumulatively and iteratively. the provision of long-term employee benefits was measured via data on factors as diverse as whether companies had good union relations,had 'no layoff' policies,encouraged employee involvement,and had good health and safety records.
the analysis of the empirical data that was undertaken provided support for both of the hypotheses that were tested. thus it was found that there was a positive relationship between levels of firm specific knowledge, and the provision of both economic and relationship-based governance mechanisms. overall therefore it was concluded that employees are motivated to contribute to the development of firm-specific knowledge by the provision of either type of governance mechanism