Also the findings that are supposed to be gained from reconnaissance measures and checks pursuant to § 15.1 of the Aviation Security Act are, in the opinion of the Cockpit Association, vague at best, even with ideal weather conditions. In the opinion of the Cockpit Association, there are limits to the approach of interceptors to an aircraft that has become conspicuous in view of the dangers involved. For this reason, the possibility of making out the situation and the events on board of such an aircraft is, according to the Cockpit Association, limited even if there is visual contact, which, moreover, is often difficult to establish. Under these circumstances, the assessment of the motivation and the objectives of the hijackers of an aircraft that is made on the basis of the facts ascertained were said to probably remain, as a general rule, speculative to the very end. Consequently, the danger concerning the application of § 14.3 of the Aviation Security Act was said to be that the order to shoot down the aircraft was made too early on an uncertain factual basis if, within the time slot available, which as a general rule is extremely narrow, armed force was at all supposed to be used in a timely manner with prospects of success and without disproportionately endangering people who are not participants in the crime. For such a mission to be effective, it was said to have to be accepted from the very beginning that the operation was possibly not required at all. In other words, reactions would probably often have to be excessive.