We examine the association between corporate governance structures and incidences of listing
suspension from the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa. Using a matched-pairs research
design, we compare 81 firms suspended between 1999 and 2005 to an equal number of control
firms matched in terms of time, size and industry. Employing a conditional logistic model, we
find that the likelihood of suspension is higher in firms with a smaller proportion of nonexecutive
directors, without an audit committee, and with greater block-share ownership and
higher gearing (i.e. leverage). Further analysis splitting block-share ownership into institutional
and non-institutional investors provides mixed results. While we find a positive association
between suspension and non-institutional investors, we observe no association with institutional
investors. No association is detected for board size, role duality, directors' share ownership,
auditor quality and return on assets. Given the paucity of studies examining listing suspension
from stock exchanges and corporate governance mechanisms, these findings contribute to the
literature. Additionally, the dearth of research on corporate governance in developing countries
suggests that our findings have important implications for policy makers in these countries as
they endeavor to improve corporate governance
We examine the association between corporate governance structures and incidences of listing
suspension from the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa. Using a matched-pairs research
design, we compare 81 firms suspended between 1999 and 2005 to an equal number of control
firms matched in terms of time, size and industry. Employing a conditional logistic model, we
find that the likelihood of suspension is higher in firms with a smaller proportion of nonexecutive
directors, without an audit committee, and with greater block-share ownership and
higher gearing (i.e. leverage). Further analysis splitting block-share ownership into institutional
and non-institutional investors provides mixed results. While we find a positive association
between suspension and non-institutional investors, we observe no association with institutional
investors. No association is detected for board size, role duality, directors' share ownership,
auditor quality and return on assets. Given the paucity of studies examining listing suspension
from stock exchanges and corporate governance mechanisms, these findings contribute to the
literature. Additionally, the dearth of research on corporate governance in developing countries
suggests that our findings have important implications for policy makers in these countries as
they endeavor to improve corporate governance
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
