In addition, this study contributes to accounting literature
in the following specific ways. Thus, several writers
have argued that FVA is procyclical (Enria et al., 2004:45;
Laux & Leuz, 2009:828); their views are repeated in this
paper but this time within a formal framework and
nuanced with the argument that the role of FVA during
a downturn is likely to be blunted by the flexibility allowed
in FVA regulations. An implication of the foregoing
is that the role of FVA in the global financial crisis should
rather be sought before or after the crisis and not during
the crisis. The model developed explains why McMahon
(2011:54) is accurate when stating ‘‘Mark-to-market feedback
loops are not exclusive to declining periods – feedback
loops also occur during upswings, although not
quite as fast’’ (this paper’s emphasis). The model shows
that the seeds for the coming downturn are sown during
the upswing with the purest role for FVA being the
replacement in bank capital of liquid assets with unrealised
(and thus risky) FVA gains; bad capital driving out
good capital. The simple running example used to demonstrate
the model that follows shows how a small change
in the value of fair valued assets can lead to a much larger
effect (a factor of 16 in the example but 30 is not uncommon)
on a bank’s balance sheet; this contradicts the argument
that the fair value measurement of financial
instruments must be pervasive to be dangerous (Gebhardt,
2012:267&271; United States Securities & Exchange
Commission, 2008:4).