First, under the TAC, either Cambodia or Thailand could bring the dispute to the
High Council, which is a body comprising Foreign Ministers of all ASEAN Member
States. Before the High Council can be convened, however, its Chair would need to
seek written confirmations from both Cambodia and Thailand that they agreed to
use the procedure to resolve their dispute, or the High Council could not proceed.
Since there is no timeframe specified for the parties to submit their confirmation,
either party could block the process by objecting to the initiation or simply by
providing no written confirmation. Even when both parties have agreed to let the
High Council intervene, as a political body comprising all Member States, parties to
the dispute included, it is unlikely that the High Council could produce any definitive
solution on a consensus basis. Even if a consensus is reached, disputing parties are not obliged to undertake the decisions or recommendations by the High Council. In a
way, its design makes the TAC dispute settlement mechanism weak, since the
employment of the mechanism is premised on prior agreement, consistent approval,
and voluntary compliance by all dispute parties.