Bring to this story the role of institutional origins. Then a particular institutional history may be more suited to particular subsets of occupations, driving the country in ques- tion into a determinate slot in the world economy. From that point on, the persistent cross-country inequalities generated by the market-based theory will continue to link past institutions to subsequent growth. In short, initial institutional differences may be correlated with subsequent performance, but the the magnitude of that under- or over- performance is not to be entirely traced to initial history. Distant history could simply have served as a marker for some countries to supply a particular range of occupations, goods and services. Today’s inequality may well be driven, not by that far-away history but simply by the world equilibrium path that follows on those initial conditions. If all goods are needed, there must be banana producers, sugar manufactureres, coffee growers, and high-tech enclaves, but there cannot be too little or too many of any of them.
The “inefficient political power” argument used in Section 3.5 can also be transplanted to international interactions. It may well be that a large part of such interactions — protection of international property rights, restrictions on technology transfer, or barriers to trade — is used to deter the entry of developing countries onto a level playing field in which they can successfully compete with their compatriots in developed countries. It would certainly be naive to disregard this point of view altogether.
Looked at this way this way, our view of history fits in well with the entire debate on globalization. One might view one side of this debate as emphasizing the convergence attributes of globalization: outsourcing, the establishment of international production standards, technology transfer, political accountability, responsible macroeconomic poli- cies may all be invoked as footsoldiers in the service of convergence.
On the other side of the battlelines are equally formidable opponents. A skewed playing field can only keep tipping, so goes the argument. The protection of intellectual property is just a way of maintaining or widening existing gaps in knowledge. Technology trans- fers are inappropriate because the input mix isn’t right. Nonconvexities and increasing returns are endemic.
My goal here isn’t to take sides on this debate (though like everyone, I do have an opinion) but to clarify it from a “nonconvergence perspective” that has so far received more attention within the closed economy. There is a strong parallel between globalization (and those contented or discontented with it, to borrow a phrase from Joseph Stiglitz (2002)) and the questions of convergence and divergence in closed economies.
Bring to this story the role of institutional origins. Then a particular institutional history may be more suited to particular subsets of occupations, driving the country in ques- tion into a determinate slot in the world economy. From that point on, the persistent cross-country inequalities generated by the market-based theory will continue to link past institutions to subsequent growth. In short, initial institutional differences may be correlated with subsequent performance, but the the magnitude of that under- or over- performance is not to be entirely traced to initial history. Distant history could simply have served as a marker for some countries to supply a particular range of occupations, goods and services. Today’s inequality may well be driven, not by that far-away history but simply by the world equilibrium path that follows on those initial conditions. If all goods are needed, there must be banana producers, sugar manufactureres, coffee growers, and high-tech enclaves, but there cannot be too little or too many of any of them.The “inefficient political power” argument used in Section 3.5 can also be transplanted to international interactions. It may well be that a large part of such interactions — protection of international property rights, restrictions on technology transfer, or barriers to trade — is used to deter the entry of developing countries onto a level playing field in which they can successfully compete with their compatriots in developed countries. It would certainly be naive to disregard this point of view altogether.Looked at this way this way, our view of history fits in well with the entire debate on globalization. One might view one side of this debate as emphasizing the convergence attributes of globalization: outsourcing, the establishment of international production standards, technology transfer, political accountability, responsible macroeconomic poli- cies may all be invoked as footsoldiers in the service of convergence.On the other side of the battlelines are equally formidable opponents. A skewed playing field can only keep tipping, so goes the argument. The protection of intellectual property is just a way of maintaining or widening existing gaps in knowledge. Technology trans- fers are inappropriate because the input mix isn’t right. Nonconvexities and increasing returns are endemic.My goal here isn’t to take sides on this debate (though like everyone, I do have an opinion) but to clarify it from a “nonconvergence perspective” that has so far received more attention within the closed economy. There is a strong parallel between globalization (and those contented or discontented with it, to borrow a phrase from Joseph Stiglitz (2002)) and the questions of convergence and divergence in closed economies.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
