Bush’s policy toward North Korea angered South Korea, imposing enormous strains on the U.S.-ROK alliance. Seoul, holding more than one quarter of the nation’s population, was within easy reach of DRPK artillery. During Bush’s visit to South Korea in early 2002, Kim Dae-jong reminded him that if the Korean War resumed, the South Korean people would pay a gigantic price in death and destruction.79 Not surprisingly, the ROK government consistently opposed the U.S. pursuit of regime change in North Korea because prospective costs of rehabilitation as a result of premature reunification were staggering. According to Lee and Moon, Seoul’s approach of “unconditional reciprocity” toward the DPRK doomed Hawk Engagement because it made cooperation with the United States contingent on serious pursuit of a negotiated settlement. Russia, and to a lesser extent Japan, also favored engagement with North Korea. All three agreed on the necessity for North Korea to terminate its nuclear weapons program, but they suspected that the Bush administration was looking for an excuse to stage a military attack to achieve this purpose. Opposing efforts to isolate the DPRK, they insisted on resolving the crisis through negotiations, resisting Bush’s pressure to impose economic sanctions because they feared this would ignite a war.80