Another problem with the IMF=s approach to the Asia crisis was its poorly-thought-out approach to the banking system. Its initial approach was to close a series of banks and financial institutions as a means for the Asian governments to signal that they intended to introduce tough reform measures. The failed banking approach was most clearly demonstrated in Indonesia, were
16 banks were closthe Asia crisis was its poorly-thought-out approached on November 1, 1997, in the very first policy action taken under the IMF program. As the IMF itself later admitted in an internal document, this move backfired.7 There is little doubt that these banks, as well as others, were in poor shape and needed to be merged, closed, or recapitalized. The problem was that the banks were closed very abruptly and without a
comprehensive and well-thought-out financial restructuring plan in place. The IMF=s initial program failed to include provisions for deposit insurance, for managing the performing and nonperforming
assets of these and other banks, or for securing and strengthening the rest of the banking system. The closures set off a bank run that began to undermine the rest of the banking system, including healthy banks. In the months that followed, the Indonesian central bank was
forced to provide huge lines of credit to keep the banking system liquid. (Some of these loans were apparently made under pressure from the president to support crony banking friends of the
Suharto clan). These credits added to the money supplied and helped fuel inflation during the height of the crisis. Critics who argue that this approach was appropriate simply because the
banks were in bad shape, or who argue that Indonesia=s mistake was to close too few banks, simply miss the point that the problem was the hurried approach, in a context lacking deposit insurance and a comprehensive and workable financial restructuring plan.8 In the end, all three
countries -- Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea -- ended up making blanket promises to back bank
deposits, so that the IMF=s initial tough line was in vain in any event.