Other white collar offenses present a converse problem:
proof of mens rea is so crucial to their definition that conduct
performed without it not only fails to expose the actor to criminal
(as opposed to civil) liability, but is not regarded as wrongful
at all. Consider, for example, the case of bribery. Imagine that
X, a constituent of Congressman Y, gives Y a certain amount of
money (which, we can further assume, falls within the amounts
permissible under campaign finance laws). Assuming that X acts
with the expectation of receiving nothing in return, he has committed
no offense; he has merely made a legal campaign contribution.
X’s act of giving money to Y would constitute a bribe if
and only if X “corruptly . . . inten[ded] to influence” an official
act.42 The problem, however, is that it is notoriously difficult to
determine whether an actor acted with corrupt intent. In light of
such difficulties, it is not surprising that such conduct is often
viewed as morally ambiguous.