This approach to error raises the problem of the unreliability of
mechanisms to expose incompetence. Imagine, for instance, that Jackson
had fewer resources to marshal in his defense and had either been unable to
procure defense experts or had procured less able defense experts who had
corroborated the misidentification. The examiners who made the
misidentification would now be presumed competent. Indeed, according to
the logic put forward by proponents of fingerprint identification, the jury
would be justified in believing—or being told—that forensic fingerprint
identification, when in the hands of “competent” experts such as these, is
error-free. Alternatively, consider the case of the identifications made by
these experts just before they took on the Jackson case. Should the experts
be deemed competent in these judgments or incompetent?
Finally, it should be noted that all of these attributions of
incompetence are simply postulated. No evidence was advanced to show
that Sedlacek, Cook, Welbaum, or Creighton were incompetent. Instead,
the presumed misattributions serve as the sole evidence of incompetence.