as described in FM 100–5, operational art
became the principal focus for a “level of
war” and assumed the responsibility for
campaign planning. In time, the vigor of this
conception reduced political leadership to
the role of “strategic sponsors” and quite specifically
intervened to widen the gap between
politics and strategy. The result has been
a well-demonstrated ability to win battles
that have not always contributed to strategic
success: “a way of battle rather than a way
of war.” The creation of an operational level
of war undid a lot of good work—to connect
politics and tactics—that had been done by
theorists since Clausewitz.
This pernicious solecism has confused our
response to the continuing evolution of warfare.
At a time when the connections between
tactics and politics are being continuously
strengthened and exploited by actual and
putative enemies, we have stretched the
meaning of operational art until it has become
a near synonym for the entirety of warfare. In
combination with its role as a defining component
of the jurisdiction of the profession of