First, let’s return once more to the product-choice problem shown in Table 13.9. The firm that introduces its new breakfast cereal first will do best. But which firm will introduce its cereal first? Even if both firms require the same amount of time to gear up production, each has an incentive to commit itself first to the sweet cereal. The key word is commit. If firm 1 simply announces it will produce the sweet cereal, Firm 2 will have little reason to believe it. After all, Firm 2, knowing the incentives, can make the same announcement louder and more vociferously. Firm 1 must constrain its own behavior in some way that convinces Firm 2 that Firm 1 has no choice but to produce the sweet cereal. Firm 1 might launch an expensive advertising campaign describing the new sweet cereal well before its introduction, thereby putting its reputation on the line. Firm1 might also sign a contract for the forward delivery of a large quantity of sugar (and make the contact public, or at least send a copy to Firm 2) .The idea is for Firm 1 to commit itself to produce the sweet cereal. Commitment is a strategic move that will induce Firm 2 to make the decision that Firm 1 wants it to make-namely, to produce the crispy cereal.