In this paper, we propose an information-economic interpretation of certain
features of the accounting measurement apparatus. The primary function
of accounting is to convey information to its users. In performing such
a conveyance task, certain recognizable accrual accounting features, like
flexible or stringent recognition rules, which require deviations from the
fair value approach, emerge in response to characteristics of the economic
and informational environment. Such features of accounting, in turn, affect
firms’ real decisions. In this paper, we highlight the inherent/incentive uncertainty
in the information environment and the capital structure decision.
In doing so, we focus on the trade-off between flexible rules versus stringent
rules. Flexible accounting rules have the advantage of conveying more
information. In our model, we emphasize the higher moments of the underlying
random variables as the additional information conveyed by flexible
rules, and this information is critical for financing decisions (debt or equity
choices). Stringent accounting rules have the advantage of fending off managerial
misuse of accounting flexibility. We show that, by preventing a firm
from making opportunistic reporting choices ex post, the stringent accounting
rules cause the firm to be better off ex ante. Such trade-offs, it seems,
also emerge in the current debate over principle-based versus rule-based
accounting standards.
Our study is preliminary, and future studies can expand in either one of
two directions: further understanding of how other accounting features affect
capital structure or studying how information demands by debt investors
affect accounting.
In this paper, we propose an information-economic interpretation of certainfeatures of the accounting measurement apparatus. The primary functionof accounting is to convey information to its users. In performing sucha conveyance task, certain recognizable accrual accounting features, likeflexible or stringent recognition rules, which require deviations from thefair value approach, emerge in response to characteristics of the economicand informational environment. Such features of accounting, in turn, affectfirms’ real decisions. In this paper, we highlight the inherent/incentive uncertaintyin the information environment and the capital structure decision.In doing so, we focus on the trade-off between flexible rules versus stringentrules. Flexible accounting rules have the advantage of conveying moreinformation. In our model, we emphasize the higher moments of the underlyingrandom variables as the additional information conveyed by flexiblerules, and this information is critical for financing decisions (debt or equitychoices). Stringent accounting rules have the advantage of fending off managerialmisuse of accounting flexibility. We show that, by preventing a firmfrom making opportunistic reporting choices ex post, the stringent accountingrules cause the firm to be better off ex ante. Such trade-offs, it seems,also emerge in the current debate over principle-based versus rule-basedaccounting standards.Our study is preliminary, and future studies can expand in either one oftwo directions: further understanding of how other accounting features affectcapital structure or studying how information demands by debt investorsaffect accounting.
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