Fifth, the system kept relying on “predictions,” not noticing that the past track record of predictions by central bankers and economists can be used to make astrologists look good. Yet the entire economic system rested on these flimsy predictions — while we were advocating a system that had isolated parts to withstand prediction errors.
We were repeatedly told that there was evidence that the system was stable, that we were in “the Great Moderation,” a common practice that mistakes absence of evidence for evidence of absence. For the financial system to be viable, the solution is for it to resemble the restaurant business: decentralized, with mistakes that stay local and that cannot bring down the entire apparatus.
As we said, the financial system nearly collapsed, but it was only money. We now find ourselves facing nearly the same five fallacies for our caution against the growth in popularity of G.M.O.s.
First, there has been a tendency to label anyone who dislikes G.M.O.s as anti-science — and put them in the anti-antibiotics, antivaccine, even Luddite category. There is, of course, nothing scientific about the comparison. Nor is the scholastic invocation of a “consensus” a valid scientific argument.
Interestingly, there are similarities between arguments that are pro-G.M.O. and snake oil, the latter having relied on a cosmetic definition of science. The charge of “therapeutic nihilism” was leveled at people who contested snake oil medicine at the turn of the 20th century. (At that time, anything with the appearance of sophistication was considered “progress.”)
Second, we are told that a modified tomato is not different from a naturally occurring tomato. That is wrong: The statistical mechanism by which a tomato was built by nature is bottom-up, by tinkering in small steps (as with the restaurant business, distinct from contagion-prone banks). In nature, errors stay confined and, critically, isolated.
Third, the technological salvation argument we faced in finance is also present with G.M.O.s, which are intended to “save children by providing them with vitamin-enriched rice.” The argument’s flaw is obvious: In a complex system, we do not know the causal chain, and it is better to solve a problem by the simplest method, and one that is unlikely to cause a bigger problem.
Fourth, by leading to monoculture — which is the same in finance, where all risks became systemic — G.M.O.s threaten more than they can potentially help. Ireland’s population was decimated by the effect of monoculture during the potato famine. Just consider that the same can happen at a planetary scale.
Fifth, and what is most worrisome, is that the risk of G.M.O.s are more severe than those of finance. They can lead to complex chains of unpredictable changes in the ecosystem, while the methods of risk management with G.M.O.s — unlike finance, where some effort was made — are not even primitive.
The G.M.O. experiment, carried out in real time and with our entire food and ecological system as its laboratory, is perhaps the greatest case of human hubris ever. It creates yet another systemic, “too big too fail” enterprise — but one for which no bailouts will be possible when it fails.
ห้า ระบบเก็บจริงใน "คาดคะเน ไม่สังเกตเห็นว่า สามารถใช้คาดคะเนโดยธนาคารกลางและนักเศรษฐศาสตร์ประวัติที่ผ่านมาเพื่อให้ดูดี astrologists แต่ ระบบเศรษฐกิจทั้งหมดวางบนคาดการณ์เหล่านี้บอบบาง — ในขณะที่เราได้สนับสนุนระบบที่มีแยกชิ้นส่วนให้ทนทานต่อการคาดเดาข้อผิดพลาดเราได้ซ้ำ ๆ บอกว่า มีหลักฐานว่า ระบบไม่มีเสถียรภาพ ว่า เรา "แต่ดี จารีตที่ผิดขาดหลักฐานสำหรับหลักฐานของการขาดงาน สำหรับระบบการเงินจะเป็นไปได้ การแก้ปัญหาคือมันจะมีลักษณะธุรกิจร้านอาหาร: แบบกระจายศูนย์ มีความผิดพลาดที่อยู่ในพื้นที่ และที่ไม่สามารถนำมาลงเครื่องทั้งหมดเรากล่าว เกือบยุบระบบการเงิน แต่มันเป็นเงินเท่านั้น เราค้นหาตัวเองหันหน้าเกือบเดียวกันห้า fallacies สำหรับข้อควรระวังของเรากับการเจริญเติบโตของ G.M.O.s.ครั้งแรก มีแนวโน้มที่จะป้ายชื่อทุกคนที่ไม่ชอบ G.M.O.s เป็นวิทยาศาสตร์กัน — และใส่ในยาปฏิชีวนะป้องกัน antivaccine แม้ประเภท Luddite มี แน่นอน อะไรวิทยาศาสตร์เกี่ยวกับการเปรียบเทียบ หรือจะเรียกหนังสือของ "ฉันทามติ" อาร์กิวเมนต์ทางวิทยาศาสตร์ถูกต้องInterestingly, there are similarities between arguments that are pro-G.M.O. and snake oil, the latter having relied on a cosmetic definition of science. The charge of “therapeutic nihilism” was leveled at people who contested snake oil medicine at the turn of the 20th century. (At that time, anything with the appearance of sophistication was considered “progress.”)Second, we are told that a modified tomato is not different from a naturally occurring tomato. That is wrong: The statistical mechanism by which a tomato was built by nature is bottom-up, by tinkering in small steps (as with the restaurant business, distinct from contagion-prone banks). In nature, errors stay confined and, critically, isolated.Third, the technological salvation argument we faced in finance is also present with G.M.O.s, which are intended to “save children by providing them with vitamin-enriched rice.” The argument’s flaw is obvious: In a complex system, we do not know the causal chain, and it is better to solve a problem by the simplest method, and one that is unlikely to cause a bigger problem.Fourth, by leading to monoculture — which is the same in finance, where all risks became systemic — G.M.O.s threaten more than they can potentially help. Ireland’s population was decimated by the effect of monoculture during the potato famine. Just consider that the same can happen at a planetary scale.Fifth, and what is most worrisome, is that the risk of G.M.O.s are more severe than those of finance. They can lead to complex chains of unpredictable changes in the ecosystem, while the methods of risk management with G.M.O.s — unlike finance, where some effort was made — are not even primitive.The G.M.O. experiment, carried out in real time and with our entire food and ecological system as its laboratory, is perhaps the greatest case of human hubris ever. It creates yet another systemic, “too big too fail” enterprise — but one for which no bailouts will be possible when it fails.
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