It would be wrong to decide in favor of the British Constitution simply
because it has lasted for a hundred years and looks as if it should last
for centuries more. As far as human institutions are concerned, where are
those that have not lasted for a very long time, however bad they may be?
Is it not the case that even despotism goes on for a long time, even seeming
to be eternal in the greatest part of the world?
A better proof would be to refer to effects. By comparing the English
people to their continental neighbors with this in mind, it is difficult not
to believe that they do have something better. Indeed, what the English
people have is a constitution, however incomplete it may be, while we
have none. The difference is considerable. It is hardly surprising that the
effects are noticeable. But it is surely a mistake to attribute everything
good about England to the sole power of the constitution. There is, selfevidently,
at least one law that is worth more than the constitution itself.
I mean, of course, trial by jury, the true guarantor of individual liberty in
every country in the world where men aspire to be free. This way of providing
justice is the only one able to offer protection from the abuse of
judicial power, something so frequent and so redoubtable wherever judgment
is not given by one’s peers. Once it exists, all that is needed for anyone
to be free is to take precautions against illegal orders emanating from
ministerial power. For that, what is needed is either a good constitution,
which England does not have, or a set of circumstances in which the head
of the executive power is not in a position to use force to back up his arbitrary
will. It is not difficult to see that the English nation is the only nation
to have been allowed not to have a standing army that might be a
threat to the nation. This is also why it is the only nation that is able to be
free without having a good constitution. This reflection ought to be
enough to make us weary of the mania for imitating our neighbors. Better,
instead, to consult our own needs; they are nearer to us and will inform
us rather better. If you want to try to naturalize the English
Constitution here, you will have no difficulty in obtaining its defects because
they will be of use to the only power whose obstruction you will
have to fear. But will you obtain any of its advantages? This question is
more problematic because here you will encounter a power with an interest
in frustrating your desires. What, after all, is the reason for desiring
an exotic constitution with such ardor? It is because it looks as if it has approached
the proper principles of the social state. But if, in every sphere,
there is a model of the good and the beautiful that is used to assess the
amount of progress that has been made towards what is right, and if it
cannot now be said that, in terms of the social art, this model is known
less to us now than it was to the English in 1688, why should we spurn
the very archetype of the good and restrict ourselves instead to imitating
132 Political Writings
a mere copy? Would it not be better to raise our ambition directly and
seek instead to become an example to every other nation?
มันจะไม่ถูกต้องในการตัดสินใจในความโปรดปรานของรัฐธรรมนูญอังกฤษเพียงเนื่องจากมันได้กินเวลานานเป็นร้อยปี และดูเหมือนมันจะสุดสำหรับศตวรรษที่เพิ่มเติม เป็นสถาบันที่มนุษย์มีความกังวล ที่อยู่ผู้ที่ไม่มีกินเวลานานมาก อย่างไรก็ตามพวกเขาอาจจะไม่ดีมันไม่ได้เป็นกรณีที่แม้ despotism ไปเป็นเวลานาน แม้ด้วยเป็นนิรันดร์ในส่วนต้น ๆ ของโลกหลักฐานดีที่จะดูผล โดยการเปรียบเทียบภาษาอังกฤษคนเพื่อบ้านของพวกเขาแบบคอนติเนนตัลนี้ในใจ ไม่ยากเชื่อว่า พวกเขามีสิ่งที่ดีกว่า จริง อะไรเป็นภาษาอังกฤษคนมีเป็นธรรมนูญ ไม่สมบูรณ์อย่างไรก็ตามมันอาจจะ ในขณะที่เราไม่มี ความแตกต่างเป็นอย่างมาก ไม่น่าแปลกใจที่การผลจะเห็นได้ชัด แต่เป็นความผิดพลาดจะแสดงทุกอย่างแน่นอนที่ดีเกี่ยวกับประเทศอังกฤษรัฐธรรมนูญอำนาจแต่เพียงผู้เดียว มี selfevidentlyกฎหมายอย่างน้อยหนึ่งที่มีมูลค่ามากกว่ารัฐธรรมนูญเองผมหมายถึง แน่นอน ทดลอง โดยคณะกรรมการ ผู้ค้ำประกันจริงของแต่ละบุคคลในทุกประเทศในโลกที่คนปรารถนาจะเป็นอิสระ วิธีนี้ให้ความยุติธรรมเป็นหนึ่งเดียวที่สามารถให้ความคุ้มครองจากการละเมิดของยุติธรรมพลัง บ่อยดังนั้น และดังนั้น redoubtable ทุกคำพิพากษาถูกกำหนด โดยหนึ่งของเพื่อน เมื่อมี ทั้งหมดที่จำเป็นสำหรับทุกคนจะฟรีจะระวังใบสั่งไม่ถูกต้องจากministerial power. For that, what is needed is either a good constitution,which England does not have, or a set of circumstances in which the headof the executive power is not in a position to use force to back up his arbitrarywill. It is not difficult to see that the English nation is the only nationto have been allowed not to have a standing army that might be athreat to the nation. This is also why it is the only nation that is able to befree without having a good constitution. This reflection ought to beenough to make us weary of the mania for imitating our neighbors. Better,instead, to consult our own needs; they are nearer to us and will informus rather better. If you want to try to naturalize the EnglishConstitution here, you will have no difficulty in obtaining its defects becausethey will be of use to the only power whose obstruction you willhave to fear. But will you obtain any of its advantages? This question ismore problematic because here you will encounter a power with an interestin frustrating your desires. What, after all, is the reason for desiringan exotic constitution with such ardor? It is because it looks as if it has approachedthe proper principles of the social state. But if, in every sphere,there is a model of the good and the beautiful that is used to assess theamount of progress that has been made towards what is right, and if itcannot now be said that, in terms of the social art, this model is knownless to us now than it was to the English in 1688, why should we spurnthe very archetype of the good and restrict ourselves instead to imitating132 Political Writingsa mere copy? Would it not be better to raise our ambition directly andseek instead to become an example to every other nation?
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