Hypothesis development
The existence of a cross-acceleration provision can affect the value of the combined debt claims on the borrower by
increasing the likelihood of cascading defaults that result in the borrower’s liquidation. When borrowers are worth more in
liquidation than as a going concern, cross-acceleration provisions can potentially result in value increasing liquidation.
That is, when a firm with a low ratio of going concern to liquidation value defaults on their bank debt, the cascading
defaults associated with cross-acceleration provisions will likely result in a value increasing liquidation (see Ex. 1 in Panel A of
Appendix A).
For borrowers with a going concern value in excess of their liquidation value, the cascading defaults that can result
from cross-acceleration provisions can result in a value decreasing liquidation. That is, if it is in the bank’s best interest to
demand early repayment despite the decrease in overall borrower value that results from liquidating a firm with a higher
going concern value, then the cross-accelerating provision increases the costs associated with technical default of their
financial covenants. (See Ex. 3 of Panel A of Appendix A.)
Even in the absence of a differential between the expected liquidation and going concern value, the relative benefit of
liquidation caused by cross-acceleration provisions will differ for public debt holders based on the risk associated with the
borrower’s going concern value, since the value of upside potential is shared with equity holders. (See Panel B of Appendix A).