Meanwhile, Christopher Bourne had negotiated to by the store’s freehold from Berners Estate for half a million pound, but crucially failed to get family agreement. The company that bought the business in 1978 was make as enormous profit in less than 12 months by buying and reselling the freehold of the large island site while sacrificing the retail business. The key advantages of family – run business had been strong company identity and continuity; it was also the kind of business whose ‘benevolent paternalism’ still maintained the 750-room hostel in Bloomsbury for its employees, hardly an indication of short-termism. Yet Bourne and Hollingsworth also faced increasing internal problems typical of paternalistic family – run business: disparate and strong company identity and continuity: it was also the kind of business whose ‘benevolent pateralism’ still maintained the 750-room hostel in Bloomsbury for it employees, hardly an indication of short-termism. Yet Bourne and Hollingsworth also faced increasing internal problems typical of a paternalistic family-run business: disparate and complex financial interest that were spread through extensive family networks led to inflexibility and inertia in the face of external pressure. Despite the efforts of its senior management, the company was increasingly vulnerable in an inflationary property market and an uncertain retail environment.
When Bourne and Hollingsworth went public in 1951, the company had retained family control, yet were fears that the death of majority shareholders would have meant the valuation of company on an asset basis with large death duties, which would have been devastating to the business. As custodian of the family firm inherited from his uncle, Stafford Bourne, Christopher Bourne had negotiate the vested interests of relatives and pre-empt paternal death duties. Thus the family business, despite its appeal to the customers, was also a liability. The unanimity needed to avoid fragmentation through piecemeal selling of shares by alienated family shareholders proved unobtainable. According to as internal report of 1971, the Bourne family had 69% of share holdings, but many of its members could not be relied on to decide together on policy and action. While an ‘inner circle’ were directly involved in running the business, William Bourne and seven children and their descendent included 19 first cousins.19 some 73 family members were personal and trust holding shareholders, making it impossible to make quick decisions that prioritized the success of the retail business. Although various options including a merger with the Army and Navy stores were considered in the 1960s and ‘70s, the difficulty of appeasing such a large family constituency, some of whom may have been driven by fear of taxation as much as by informed knowledge about the retail and property scene, may have precluded realistic decision about the future of the business.
By the mid-1970s, Bourne and Hollingsworth was making a loss, despite a growth in sales. It was losing trade to chain stores, unable to match their competitive advantages in terms of economies of scale and cheaper staff costs, and was losing out because of the increasing importance of brand recognition for out-of-town consumers. Its tourist trade decline and there and there was competition for a younger generation of consumer from boutique spin-off fashion shops. While Bourne and Hollingsworth had managed to retain its core middle-aged, middle-class market, the boutique boom of the 1960s was to have unexpected consequences trough the subsequent capitalization of the small enterprise boom. Raybeck was an East End garment manufacturer which had moved into fashion retail on back of the boutique phenomenon. During the 1960s and 70s, Raybeck did very well, increasing growth and profits. In 1967, emulating new fashion labels named for model