Since the 2000s, when the government started setting a target of sending a million workers every
year, the search for overseas labor markets has become a standard practice. In times of crisis –
whether national, regional or global – this goal assumes greater urgency as the global financial
crisis has recently demonstrated.
Deployment levels suggest that the crisis has not slowed down international labor migration from
the Philippines. Likewise, remittances continued to support the Philippine economy. Thus, rather
than contract, deployment and remittances continued to increase in 2008 and 2009. Levels of
displacement have also been modest and were quite contained, mostly involving Taiwan and the
UAE. However, these numerical indicators do not tell the whole story. Deployment levels may
remain high, but they do not reveal the quality of jobs and the treatment of OFWs during the
crisis. Displacement and repatriation may not be massive, but they conceal the conditions under
which migrant workers cannot freely choose to return home. Remittances may continue
unabated, but the sacrifices migrants make to support their families back home are not known.
Those who were repatriated were provided with the usual prescriptions: entrepreneurship or local
employment (Sabater, 2009). Funds to support entrepreneurship and local employment were
offered to repatriated OFWs. A limited number of displaced OFWs were provided training and
start-up capital to start a business. Nothing is known about the number of OFWs who opted for
local employment and what kind of employment they obtained. Had there been more displaced
OFWs who were sent home, the capacity of the government to effectively respond to the
challenge is uncertain. This raises anew the inadequacy of reintegration programs to effectively
address the vulnerabilities confronting displaced OFWs. A follow-up of those who were
provided capital and training for entrepreneurship would be helpful in assessing the effectiveness
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of this response. One report indicates that many displaced OFWs who availed of loans were
unable to repay their loans (Opiniano, 2010a). The tendency to offer entrepreneurship to
displaced OFWs needs rethinking – entrepreneurship may not be a viable alternative to displaced
migrant workers during an economic slump.
The government initiated important steps to gather data to monitor the crisis and its impact on
OFWs through the setting up of Help Desks in the international airport, regional offices and in
the provinces and the reports of some 41 POLOs in selected destination countries. The data
generated by these offices, as well as the data provided by the teams of officers deployed to
Taiwan and the UAE, may be collated, processed and analyzed as learning points and as a basis
for establishing guidelines for more systematic collection of data as inputs for policymaking.