During the 1970s, when inflation became the preeminent problem
facing the developed economies, a number of analysts developed a
second approach to comparative capitalism based on the concept of neocorporatism
(Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979; Berger 1981; Goldthorpe
1984; Alvarez et al. 1991). Although defined in various ways, neocorporatism
was generally associated with the capacity of a state to negotiate
durable bargains
with employers and the trade union movement
regarding
wages, working conditions, and social or economic policy.
Accordingly, a nation’s capacity for neo-corporatism was generally said
to depend on the centralization or concentration of the trade union movement,
following an Olsonian logic of collective action which specifies
that
more
encompassing unions can better internalize the economic effects
of
their
wage settlements (Olson 1965; Cameron
1984; Calmfors and Driffill
1988;
Golden 1993). Those who saw neo-corporatist bargains
as a ‘political
exchange’ emphasized the ability of states to offer
inducements as
well
as the capacity of unions to discipline their members (Pizzorno 1978;
Regini
1984; Scharpf 1987, 1991; cf. Przeworski and Wallerstein
1982).
Those
working from
this perspective categorized countries largely
by
reference
to the organization
of their trade union movement; and the
success
stories of this literature
were
the small, open economies of
northern
Europe.