we check our results using money growth in 1996 as an alternative macroeconomic control variable. it we drop Turkey,then the legal environment (judiciary,rule of law,and corruption) variables remain significant at close to their original levels (the corruption variable slips slightly) and money growth is not significant. The only variable to lose its significance is the index of anti-director rights. if we include Turkey, all the corporate governance variables, except anti-director rights, remain significant and money growth is significant at the 5% level.
we also include a dummy variable for Latin America which is one for Argentina,Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,and Venezuela in our sample. This does not affect the significant of any of the governance variable and is itself insignificant in all the exchange rate regressions. The Latin America dummy is negative, with a coefficient of around -30 in the stock market regressions,but the only effect on governance variables is to make corruption insignificant. Total reserves become positive and significant in the stock market regression; the other results for macroeconomic variables are not affected.