Further, by limiting the retaliatory withdrawal of concessions to those "substantially
equivalent," the system seeks to ensure that the price for nonperformance under the liability
rule is not too high. Although the phrasing is somewhat vague, a withdrawal of "substantially
equivalent" concessions may be understood as allowing members adversely affected by a
withdrawal of concessions under Article XXVIII to raise their level of political welfare by
reimposing protection for the benefit of domestic constituencies that will reward them for it,
but only up to the point that their level of political welfare is restored to its original level.
Indeed, during discussions on Article XXVIII in the Tariff Agreements Committee in 1947, the
proposal to include a provision for compensatory withdrawal was explained as follows: "...if
we wish to take an item out of our Schedule then clearly it is fair and proper that the countries
with whom we negotiate should be free to make the corresponding changes in their Schedules