Admittedly, the institutional arrangements supposed to guarantee auditors’ operational independence exert constraints on what the auditees can and cannot do during an audit. However, a ‘‘given organizational situation never completely constrains an actor . . . [who] always retains a margin of liberty and negotiation’’ (Crozier and Friedberg 1980, 45). In the field, auditees, while formally complying with legal and regulatory demands, can leverage the control they have of the space, time, and working atmosphere in which auditors operate to alter the latter’s capability to find material misstatements. This problem cannot be totally resolved through regulation. As we showed, no amount of rules imposed on auditees will ever make these actors entirely predictable. This view may challenge orthodox andsignificant ways through the examination of real-life situations. regulatory conceptions of audit, but the smooth conduct of an audit engagement largely depends on the auditees’ good will.