opposition a certain amount of old-style anti-Quebec prejudice,
but there was also a serious philosophical point, which
we need to articulate here.
Those who take the view that individual rights must always
come first, and, along with nondiscrimination provisions,
must take precedence over collective goals, are often
speaking from a liberal perspective that has become more
and more widespread in the Anglo-American world. Its
source is, of course, the United States, and it has recently
been elaborated and defended by some of the best philosophical
and legal minds in that society, including John
Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, and others.31
There are various formulations of the main idea, but perhaps
the one that encapsulates most clearly the point that is relevant
to us is the one expressed by Dworkin in his short paper
entitled “Liberalism.”32
Dworkin makes a distinction between two kinds of moral
commitment. We all have views about the ends of life, about
what constitutes a good life, which we and others ought to
strive for. But we also acknowledge a commitment to deal
fairly and equally with each other, regardless of how we conceive
our ends. We might call this latter commitment “procedural,”
while commitments concerning the ends of life are
“substantive.” Dworkin claims that a liberal society is one
that as a society adopts no particular substantive view about
the ends of life. The society is, rather, united around a strong
procedural commitment to treat people with equal respect.
The reason that the polity as such can espouse no substan-