States was uneasy about the closeness between the Chinese leaders and their counterparts
in Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. Besides which, the resurgence of the territorial disputes in
the South China Sea, which involve China, Taiwan and four members of ASEAN—Vietnam,
Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines—has threatened peace and security in the region. The
United States perceived the ongoing conflict as a threat to its own interest, namely, the
right to freely navigate the disputed area. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called
the conflict “a leading diplomatic priority” for the United States during the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) meeting in Vietnam in July 2010 (Ten Kate & Gaouette 2010). In 2012, China
proved that its influence in Cambodia was well established when Beijing was able to convince
Phnom Penh not to permit the issuance of the Joint Communiqué which contained
references to the South China Sea not entirely favorable to China. This was the first time in
ASEAN’s history that a joint communiqué was not released in the closing stages of a conference.
But these problems are merely symptoms of troubled Sino-U.S. relations. The real cause of
the problems lies in the power struggle between the two powers, one of which seeks to
maintain its status as the world’s sole superpower while the other has emerged as a new
challenger to the current international order. This essay concurs with the widespread belief
that China’s economic and military rise will inevitably shift the regional order that the
United States has helped to sustain since the end of the Cold War. John Mearsheimer argued
in 2005 that “A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out
of the Asia-Pacific region, in much the same way as the United States pushed the European great powers
out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century” (Mearsheimer 2005). Southeast Asia
has evidently become a battlefield in the fiercely competitive power game between the
United States and China, as both have tried, through different methods and strategies, to
retain their domination over countries in the region (Bert 2003: 83). There is a possibility
that China may use its newly gained capabilities to defy the American claim to leadership,
particularly in Southeast Asia, and to reestablish regional hegemony of its own. Indeed,
China has already extended its influence on neighboring states that were previously dominated
by U.S. interests, including Thailand (Vogelmann 2008: 2; Khalilzad et al 1999: 70).
Intervention versus Pragmatism
In May 2010, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, during his brief visit to
Bangkok on his way to Naypyidaw, proposed a meeting between representatives of the Abhisit
government and leaders of the pro-Thaksin “Red Shirts” United Front for Democracy
against Dictatorship (UDD). Defending his initiative, Campbell reflected on his country’s
growing concern about Thailand’s violently escalating conflict, stating that this was because
Thailand was a treaty ally of the United States. But the traditional political elites were
not convinced. They viewed it as a move to manipulate the political situation in Thailand.
Immediately, Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya rejected Campbell’s role as peacemaker,
calling it a plot to meddle in his country’s domestic politics. In the end, the U.S. Embassy in 1
Bangkok managed to arrange a working breakfast between Campbell and Jaturon
Chaisaeng, a former cabinet member under Thaksin Shinawatra and a Red Shirts leader, and
Noppadon Pattama, former foreign minister and Thaksin’s legal adviser, without government’s
representatives. The meeting deeply infuriated leaders in Bangkok. They were astounded
by the seemingly fluctuating policy of the U.S. government, which had previously
been openly supportive of the traditional elite. Throughout the Cold War, the United States
had forged a close alliance with the military, the bureaucracy and the palace, in their fight