The perspective that board monitoring is a function of not only the composition of the board as a whole but also of the structure and composition of the board’s subcommittees is a relatively The perspective that board monitoring is a function of not only the composition of the board as a whole but also of the structure and composition of the board’s subcommittees is a relatively The perspective that board monitoring is a function of not only the composition of the board as a whole but also of the structure and composition of the board’s subcommittees is a relatively ommittee members should be financially sophisticated. An audit committee, without financia lly sophisticated members may indeed be largely ceremonial. An active, well-functioning, and well-structured audit committee may be able to prevent earnings management. We would expect audit committees with a large proportion of independent outside directors to be more effective monitors. Audit committee members with corporate and financial backgrounds should have the experience and training to understand earnings management. Therefore, we expect that if a large proportion of the committee is made up of independent outside members with corporate and financial backgrounds, earnings management will be less likely. This expectation is consistent with the recommendations of Levitt’s Blue Ribbon Panel. Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, has pushed for improvements in the structure and function of audit committees. In September 1998 the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Security Dealers convened a Blue Ribbon Panel “to make recommendations on strengthening the role of audit committees in overseeing the corporate financial reporting process” (SEC Press Release).