In the process of giving the concept of patron clientage relevance, it has been rendered analytically sterile, First, it makes it impossible to distinguish patron-client relations from other relations, and second, one is no longer able to identify specificall political relations between unequals, as a asymmetrical relations are conceptualized as relations of patron-clientage. It has been argued that only a fairly circumscribed set of relations warrants th label of"patron-client relationship' (Kemp 1982, 1984). Since by definition all relationships, excepu,those in a peer group. are hier archical in denote patron-client relations is both imprecise and pointless. Constructively, Kemp recommends viewing social relations as on a"continuum of personalism' (1984 63) with intimate kinship relations at one end and relations of naked power at the other. The patron-client relation occupies ground mid way between these two extremes and is marked by the fact that its particularism"disguises or moderates the harsh facts of its objective inequalities(ibid.: 65). Other analysts have seized on Kemp's critic isms: but notwithstanding this, there is still a good deal of confusion regarding what should and what should not be considered indicative of a patron-client relation. In this study, I reserve use of the term patron-client relation' to dyadic, multifaceted and asymmetrical relations where there is an evident ongoing personal and reciprocal element to the relationship. Patron-client relations of this kind have become scarcer as capital rather than followers has become the primary source of power, and, conversely, as the majority of rural people rely on the market to sustain a livelihood rather than on other people who have more resources