The two moralities possess immediate and powerful echoes of Professor Ronald Dworkin's well known distinction between principle and policy 10 . More broadly they reflect two major and very familiar post-Enlightenment traditions of moral philosophy: the philosophy of duties and rights on the one hand, and the philosophy of utilitarianism on the other: Kant and Bentham. These traditions are intricate and difficult. There are for example many problems with the idea of Kant's categorical imperative, one version of which reads “Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” 11 . And the associated idea that every person is to be treated as an end and not a means is only telling if it is heavily *573 qualified. Utilitarianism is also beset by notorious problems leading to theoretical adjustments and the wobble between what is called rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism