I argue that the OIC procedure is structured in a way that systematically
undermines its effectiveness. Problematically, the power to
effectuate the OIC procedure is dispersed among four stakeholders
with divergent interests: (1) Congress, (2) the IRS, (3) the taxpayer,
and (4) financial and other supporters of the taxpayer. Each of these
players has conflicting and contradictory interests in how tax forgiveness
should operate in general, and in how the OIC procedure
should function in particular. Moreover, the actions and decisions of
each of the players may provoke counterproductive responses from
other players, such that, over time, the program’s effectiveness is weakened.
I therefore suggest that reforms likely to provoke or exacerbate
these undesirable stakeholder dynamics should be disregarded. Conversely,
reforms likely to minimize the effects of power dispersal and
interest divergence should be adopted
I argue that the OIC procedure is structured in a way that systematicallyundermines its effectiveness. Problematically, the power toeffectuate the OIC procedure is dispersed among four stakeholderswith divergent interests: (1) Congress, (2) the IRS, (3) the taxpayer,and (4) financial and other supporters of the taxpayer. Each of theseplayers has conflicting and contradictory interests in how tax forgivenessshould operate in general, and in how the OIC procedureshould function in particular. Moreover, the actions and decisions ofeach of the players may provoke counterproductive responses fromother players, such that, over time, the program’s effectiveness is weakened.I therefore suggest that reforms likely to provoke or exacerbatethese undesirable stakeholder dynamics should be disregarded. Conversely,reforms likely to minimize the effects of power dispersal andinterest divergence should be adopted
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