Once we correct our mistake, and perceive the rope as a rope, it might be thought that we have now attained true knowledge. Yet, Ᾱryadeva maintains that this is as illusory as perceiving the rope to be a snake (HV 1c–d; Tola and Dragonetti 1995, 10).
If we examine it carefully, we find that the rope is made up of threads, and that they are made up of smaller threads, and so on ad infinitum. The second aspect of svabhāva,
therefore, has to do with parts, both spatial and temporal, as well as with properties.
While the first aspect suggested independence, the second calls to mind a simple,irreducible entity, something that cannot be subjected to further analysis. If we consider the tree once more, we might strip away its branches, its leaves, and its bark, and yet, we want to claim that no matter how many parts it loses, it is always the same tree. Similarly,properties such as height and colour are said to belong to the tree, which, therefore, must be something else. We consider it the same tree, despite the changes in appearance it goes through, such as turning red in autumn, or shedding its leaves in the winter. This shows that what we consider to be the tree itself must be something other than its inessential parts and properties; perhaps svabhāva consists of its essential ones, or else it is something that underlies these characteristics. In Western philosophy, it is sometimes referred to as the individual in which properties are instantiated.