On 8 October 2005 a catastrophic earthquake titruck the Pakislanadminislered region of Kashmirr annihilating numerous towns and villayes. The oMicial death toll reached around 75,000. over 100.000 others were injured aftd over three million tefr homeless .
If propositions 4 to 6 are tueand if God(as defined by propositions I to 3)exists, exists, it follows that there will be no pain and suffering in the world, because God will have followed it inclinations and prevented it. But there is – manifestly – pain and Suffering in the world, So we must conclude either that God does not exist, or that it does not have one or more of the properties set out in propositions I to 3 In sum,the problem of evil appears to have the implication, extremely unpalatable for the theist, namely that God doesn’t care, or can’t do anything about it; or that it doesn’t exist
Dodging the bullet Attempts to avoid this devastating conclusion involve undermining some stage of the above argument. Denying that there is ultimately any such thing as evil, as advocated by Christian Scientists solves the problem at a stroke but such a remedy is too hard for most to swallow Abandoning any of the three basic properties ascribed to God (limiting its knowledge power or moral excellence)is too damaging for most theists to accept so the usual strategy is to try explain how evil
Two problems of evil
The probtem of gvil can Take two quite distlnctr though rented, forTns. In the logical version {roughly as presented in the first pan of this chapter), the impossibility of evil and God coexisting is demonstrated by deductive argumem: it is claimed thai the ., character of God is inconsistent with the occurrence of svil. and hencs that belief in God is actually irrational. Tha evident! a I version of the pFobtam of evil is in effect sn invBreion of the design argument (see page 1S2). using the endless tale of hnrTors in ths world to arsue the improjwhtlity that it is the creation of an all-powerfui. sll-loving godThis second version is much less ambitious than the logical version, seeking only to urge that God is unfikelv to exist, but it is harder to rebut as a result. The logical version is formally dgfeated by showing that the co-existence of God and evil is merely possible, however improbaUethis may be thought to be. The evidential version presents a greater challenge for the theist. who must explain how some higher good for humans emerges from the catalogue of evil in the world
On 8 October 2005 a catastrophic earthquake titruck the Pakislanadminislered region of Kashmirr annihilating numerous towns and villayes. The oMicial death toll reached around 75,000. over 100.000 others were injured aftd over three million tefr homeless .If propositions 4 to 6 are tueand if God(as defined by propositions I to 3)exists, exists, it follows that there will be no pain and suffering in the world, because God will have followed it inclinations and prevented it. But there is – manifestly – pain and Suffering in the world, So we must conclude either that God does not exist, or that it does not have one or more of the properties set out in propositions I to 3 In sum,the problem of evil appears to have the implication, extremely unpalatable for the theist, namely that God doesn’t care, or can’t do anything about it; or that it doesn’t existDodging the bullet Attempts to avoid this devastating conclusion involve undermining some stage of the above argument. Denying that there is ultimately any such thing as evil, as advocated by Christian Scientists solves the problem at a stroke but such a remedy is too hard for most to swallow Abandoning any of the three basic properties ascribed to God (limiting its knowledge power or moral excellence)is too damaging for most theists to accept so the usual strategy is to try explain how evilTwo problems of evilThe probtem of gvil can Take two quite distlnctr though rented, forTns. In the logical version {roughly as presented in the first pan of this chapter), the impossibility of evil and God coexisting is demonstrated by deductive argumem: it is claimed thai the ., character of God is inconsistent with the occurrence of svil. and hencs that belief in God is actually irrational. Tha evident! a I version of the pFobtam of evil is in effect sn invBreion of the design argument (see page 1S2). using the endless tale of hnrTors in ths world to arsue the improjwhtlity that it is the creation of an all-powerfui. sll-loving godThis second version is much less ambitious than the logical version, seeking only to urge that God is unfikelv to exist, but it is harder to rebut as a result. The logical version is formally dgfeated by showing that the co-existence of God and evil is merely possible, however improbaUethis may be thought to be. The evidential version presents a greater challenge for the theist. who must explain how some higher good for humans emerges from the catalogue of evil in the world
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