The financial crisis brought billions of losses due to derivatives trading as part of hedging strategies for non-financial companies in many countries (Dodd (2009) suggests that losses totaled around U$500 billion for non-financial companies during the 2008-2009 period). This paper aims to shed light on this topic by focusing on the hedging policy of a Brazilian company that lost over U$2 billion due to exchange rate movements resulting from the financial crisis of 2008. In particular, we show how the company deviated from the optimal hedge early in 2008 by the use of “innovative” derivatives. We contribute to the literature in two ways: fist by describing in detail, with an unusually rich dataset, the hedging policies of Aracruz; and then by presenting an empirical analysis of the case, relating the downfall of the company with the indirect effects of the financial crisis. We build on previous case studies such as Brown (2001) to show how companies can indeed speculate on derivatives, even if inadvertently, and we try to provide an explanation for a class of non-financial companies that suffered heavy financial losses following direct and indirect events from the financial crisis.