In
this
paper,
I
explore
some
of
the
ways
in
which
experience
can
contribute
to
moral
knowledge,
or
what
commonly
passes
for
moral
knowledge.
As
a
way
of
focusing
the
investigation,
I
will
explore
how
one
might
attempt
to
reconcile
two
widely
held
ideas
about
morality
that
stand
in
at
least
prima
facie
tension
with
one
another.
The
first
idea
is
that
moral
knowledge—whatever
else
is
true
of
it
and
even
whether
it
exists
at
all—is
not
empirical
knowledge.
If
there
are
moral
truths,
then
the
most
fundamental
of
those
truths
are,
like
the
truths
of
pure
mathematics,
available
from
the
armchair.
The
second
idea
is
that
lack
of
experience
can
be
a
handicap
in
the
acquisition
of
moral
knowledge,
and
that
experience
of
the
world
often
proves
crucial
in
its
attainment.
Consider
first:
ARMCHAIR
ACCESS:
Moral