The corporate governance literature has frequently stressed the importance of a firm’s board of directors as a potentially effective mechanism to align the interests of corporate management with those of shareholders through its monitoring role (see, for example, Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). However, for a board of directors to carry out its monitoring responsibilities effectively, agency theorists have asserted this corporate governance feature
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should be independent of a firm’s corporate management (Fama, 1980; Young, Stedham and Beekun, 2000). Empirical findings have generally supported this proposition
The corporate governance literature has frequently stressed the importance of a firm’s board of directors as a potentially effective mechanism to align the interests of corporate management with those of shareholders through its monitoring role (see, for example, Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). However, for a board of directors to carry out its monitoring responsibilities effectively, agency theorists have asserted this corporate governance feature1should be independent of a firm’s corporate management (Fama, 1980; Young, Stedham and Beekun, 2000). Empirical findings have generally supported this proposition
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