The first assumption, that strategic groups use religion-based strategies to further theirparticular political interests and purposes, has not vanished. In fact, it is astonishingly enduring, and it should not be discarded.
6
Yet there are a number of problems with suchan interpretation, not the least of which is that it assumes that a society’s elites are so farremoved from the rest of the population that they merely manipulate the latter withoutadhering to the principles that they themselves are preaching. Although this might be thecase, as Machiavelli and Kautilya demonstrate vividly, it cannot always be assumed to betrue. The second interpretation has also had widespread currency, particularly in studiesof totalitarianism. In contrast to religion
in
politics, its claims rest on the notion of politics
as
religion; in other words, politics, ideology, and nationalism become sacralised in amanner comparable to religions. This sacralisation of politics allows for transcendentallegitimation to mobilise resources and limits reflection and thus critique, as sacrality isbased on belief not on rationality. There are, however, problems with this approach. Reli-gion is based on a vision of the transcendent and
/
or a better life in another world. Thisapplies to Buddhism as well, although this religion’s ultimate aim is the extinction of theindividual and individuality in Nirvana. However, before achieving this aim, on the way aspirations for a better life and a higher status in the next existence are both possible andlegitimate. In contrast, politics focus on a better life in this world only. Political and ideo-logical attempts to take transcendence into immanence lead to the sacralisation of the pol-itical, for example the nation. In many cases, it is simply the use of religious forms forsecular purposes, namely the ritualisation and emotionalisation of politics, that makesthese forms appear transcendent, placing them beyond discussion and reflection.
7
However, as Steigmann-Gall argues,
8
this approach assumes that religion and sacralisednationalism are mutually exclusive; however, it is possible to be both politically and ideo-logically committed and religious at the same time. Moreover, politics, nationalism, andother ideologies cannot simply be equated with religion, as though this magically explainswhat they are all about without giving at least some thought to content. The debate on tota-litarianism emphasises form over content, as though it is sufficient to employ religiousforms and symbols for new purposes while totally disregarding the content of ideologies.
9
The deployment of religious symbols need not mean that a political ideology becomes anew religion, even if the political may be sacralised or perceived as such.
10
This wouldbe easier, if the politics of the state included religious aims and tenets in its policies