The nonexistence of markets for hedging exposures to many uncertain environmental
contingencies is itself a result of uncertainty. For example, futures
markets are less likely to exist for products that have a great deal of quality
uncertainty. Insurance markets fail due to simple lack of information to
make actuarial assessments of the risks or due to asymmetric information
about the behavior and exposure of the parties seeking insurance. Such
information asymmetry gives rise to problems of adverse selection which
can, in the extreme, eliminate insurance coverage for an entire class of
exposures [Akerlof 1970]. Screening or self-selection of buyers may mitigate
the problem of "non-existent" markets for transferring and pooling risk.
Firms purchase insurance to protect against property and casualty losses and
product liability suits. Private insurers, government-sponsored agencies
(such as the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation), and multilateral
organizations (for example, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency)
provide insurance policies protecting foreign direct investments against expropriation
of assets, civil strife, war, and currency inconvertibility. With
the exceptions of product liability and worker disability, insurance coverage
for exposures to industry and firm uncertainties (see Table 2 and 3) is limited.
The cost associated with purchasing insurance is the portion of the premium
which exceeds the expected value of the firm's loss. This payment in excess
of the expected value of the loss covers the insurance company's operating
expenses as well as the implicit costs of moral hazard and adverse selection
[Shapiro & Titman 1986].
Where the possibilities for forward and futures contracting or insuring
against possible losses are limited because of a lack of market development,
the risk management focus shifts from financial practices to strategic moves
that reduce exposures to environmental uncertainties.