- ข้อความ
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Human capital, pay structure, and t
Human capital, pay structure, and the use of performance
measures in bonus compensation
Sally K. Widener ∗
Rice University, Jones Graduate School of Business, Room 331 - MS 531, 6100 Main Street,
Houston, TX 77005-1892, USA
Received 10 March 2004; accepted 4 June 2005
Abstract
Traditional financial measures have been criticized for lacking relevance in today’s economy where firms are
increasingly competing with intangible assets. However, perhaps this criticism is not detrimental to firms if they
take actions to supplement the information contained in financial measures. Thus, it is important to explore whether
and when firms recognize this potential deficiency and take action to acquire the appropriate information. This
study hypothesizes that two human resource variables, reliance on human capital and the firm’s pay structure, are
associated with the use of non-financial measures in top managers’ bonus compensation contracts since they provide
information incremental to that provided by traditional financial measures. Using archival data from 177 firms, I
estimate binary and multi-response ordered logit models. The binary logit model provides evidence that laborintensive
firms have a higher probability of placing emphasis on non-financial measures (along with traditional
financial measures) and a lower probability of relying solely on traditional financial measures. Moreover, this
relationship is moderated by the firm’s pay structure. Analysis shows that the relationship is stronger in firms that
employ a hierarchical pay structure. Furthermore, the multi-response logit model extends these finding by showing
that these firms also have a higher probability of relying on human resource measures.
1. Introduction
Executive compensation provokes debate on many fronts,1 one of which is that emphasis on financial
measures leads executives to focus on the short-term. Stone (Business Week, December 23, 2002)
summarizes the issue by saying,
The primary problem in Corporate America is not with investors’ short-term focus on quarterly
results, but with management’s desire to achieve short-term goals because of their impact on executive
compensation. ‘With the obsessive focus on quarterly numbers, management is motivated to
make decisions that are pragmatic from a short-term perspective but may impair the long-term health
of the organization,’ says Jeffrey Evans, president of the New York Society of Security Analysts.
Consider a common decision that executives make regarding investment in human capital. Compensation,
training, and other related costs are expensed in the current period. Executives focused on quarterly
financial numbers have an incentive to forego labor-related investment in order to enhance the quarterly
financial results, even though the disinvestment may be detrimental to the long-term health of the organization
(Laverty, 1996). The purpose of this study is to provide evidence on the debate by examining the
use of performance measures in executive bonus compensation and determining whether firms that rely
heavily on labor to sustain its operations supplement traditional financial measures with non-financial
measures.
Executive bonus compensation provides an interesting setting for two reasons. First, it is a significant
part of executive pay.2 Second, it is the portion of executive compensation that is intended to motivate
managerial behaviors (Milkovich and Newman, 2002; Balkcom et al., 1997; Vancil, 1979). Traditionally,
compensation contracts have been written based on financial accounting measures, especially net income,
earnings per share, and return on assets (McKenzie and Shilling, 1998). The prevailing view is that
traditional financial measures encourage a short-term focus (Laverty, 1996) while non-financial measures
focus managers on making decisions that are healthier for the long run (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Thus,
the design of executive bonus compensation provides a rich setting to study the use of financial and
non-financial performance measures.
This study investigates the association between the use of performance measures and the reliance on
human capital. Labor, or human capital, is a critical type of intangible asset on which firms increasingly
rely (Lev, 2001). The term “human capital” has many different definitions. Economists consider human
talent and knowledge to be both a form of wealth and capital (Lev and Schwartz, 1971). Strategists define
strategic human capital as the portion of theworkforce that helps the firm sustain its competitive advantage
(Barney and Wright, 1998). The broadest definition of human capital and one found in the organizational
behavior literature is that it is the knowledge and/or skills possessed by the firm’s workforce (Lev, 2001;
Barney, 1991; Becker et al., 2001). Kaplan and Norton (1996, p. 6) state,
Now all employees must contribute value by what they know and by the information they can
provide. Investing in, managing, and exploiting the knowledge of every employee have become
critical to the success of information age companies.
In accordance with the latter line of research discussed above, I define human capital as the firm’s
workforce (i.e., the value contributed through the workforce’s contribution via skills and knowledge).
I also investigate an important contextual factor that may influence the relation between the use of
performance measures and the reliance on human capital—the firm’s design of its pay structure.
I draw on both economic theory (i.e., the informativeness principle) and social psychology theory (i.e.,
equity theory) to develop hypotheses. Agency theory embraces rational choice models; research often
investigates how performance measures can be used to more closely align employee actions with the
objectives of owners (Ittner et al., 1997). However, employees work in a social environment and “one’s
actions frequently and unavoidably shape, and are shaped by, the actions of others” (Sprinkle, 2003, p.
295). In this setting, agency theory generally disregards effects from salary and bonus apportionment;
however, since research shows that matters of equity are important to employees (Cowherd and Levine,
1992), incorporating both theories allows me to undertake a more complete investigation of the use of
performance measures. Indeed, Sprinkle (2003) calls for research that incorporates the apportionment of
rewards on performance-based contracts.
Ittner et al. (1997) use the informativeness principle as the basis of an investigation of the use of
performance measures inCEObonus compensation. They argue that traditional financial measures may be
appropriate for CEOs in firms focused on cost minimization; however, for CEOs in firms following either
a quality or an innovation-oriented strategy, non-financial measures will provide incremental information
regarding the firm’s long-term strategic objectives and help better align interests within the firm. Extending
this, I rely on the informativeness principle to argue that the use of non-financial information will provide
relevant information incremental to that provided by traditional financial measures when the firm relies
on human capital. I then draw on equity theory, which predicts that employees’ behaviors and attitudes
are negatively affected when they perceive inequity in the firm’s pay structure. Sprinkle (2003) notes that
issues of fairness and equity may well influence contracting. In my setting, it is likely that the perception
of (a lack of) fairness will (exacerbate) mitigate moral hazard issues. I argue, therefore, that the association
between the likelihood of using non-financial measures in bonus compensation and the use of human
capital will depend on the design of the firm’s pay structure.
Using disclosure information from the proxy statements of 177 firms, I classify the use of information in
bonus compensation into two categories: (1) firms that emphasize financial measures versus (2) firms that
use both financial and non-financial measures. Using a cross-sectional, binary logistic model I find that
the likelihood of using both financial and non-financial measures is increasing in labor intensity3 and that
the relation is more positive when the firm employs a hierarchical pay structure. This finding supports
the argument that the pay structure moderates the association between the use of human capital and
the use of non-financial measures in executive bonus compensation. Thus, the incremental information
content of non-financial measures is important in the monitoring and control process in labor-intensive
firms. I extend the analysis by subdividing the two broad categories of performance measures into four
categories characterized as firms that rely on: (1) financial information only, (2) financial and nonfinancial
information, but a financial threshold must be met, (3) financial and non-financial information
is a contextual factor that probably influences or moderates the relation between the use of performance
measures in compensation and reliance on human capital.
2.2. The moderating effect of pay structure
Compensation structures range from flat, narrow pay structures to very wide pay structures identified
by a large gap between the lowest and highest paid employees in the firm. These structures are known
as egalitarian (e.g., small gap in pay) and hierarchical structures (e.g., large gap in pay), respectively
(Milkovich and Newman, 2002). Egalitarian structures, as compared to hierarchical structures, are characterized
by fewer pay levels within the firm, and less difference in pay both between the lower echelon
employees and higher echelon executives, and between adjacent pay levels (Bloom, 1999; Milkovich and
Newman, 2002). The human resource literature has studied either the number of pay levels within a firm
or the spread of pay between the top and bottom of the firm (e.g., Bloom, 1999). Similar to Bloom (1999),
this study foc
measures in bonus compensation
Sally K. Widener ∗
Rice University, Jones Graduate School of Business, Room 331 - MS 531, 6100 Main Street,
Houston, TX 77005-1892, USA
Received 10 March 2004; accepted 4 June 2005
Abstract
Traditional financial measures have been criticized for lacking relevance in today’s economy where firms are
increasingly competing with intangible assets. However, perhaps this criticism is not detrimental to firms if they
take actions to supplement the information contained in financial measures. Thus, it is important to explore whether
and when firms recognize this potential deficiency and take action to acquire the appropriate information. This
study hypothesizes that two human resource variables, reliance on human capital and the firm’s pay structure, are
associated with the use of non-financial measures in top managers’ bonus compensation contracts since they provide
information incremental to that provided by traditional financial measures. Using archival data from 177 firms, I
estimate binary and multi-response ordered logit models. The binary logit model provides evidence that laborintensive
firms have a higher probability of placing emphasis on non-financial measures (along with traditional
financial measures) and a lower probability of relying solely on traditional financial measures. Moreover, this
relationship is moderated by the firm’s pay structure. Analysis shows that the relationship is stronger in firms that
employ a hierarchical pay structure. Furthermore, the multi-response logit model extends these finding by showing
that these firms also have a higher probability of relying on human resource measures.
1. Introduction
Executive compensation provokes debate on many fronts,1 one of which is that emphasis on financial
measures leads executives to focus on the short-term. Stone (Business Week, December 23, 2002)
summarizes the issue by saying,
The primary problem in Corporate America is not with investors’ short-term focus on quarterly
results, but with management’s desire to achieve short-term goals because of their impact on executive
compensation. ‘With the obsessive focus on quarterly numbers, management is motivated to
make decisions that are pragmatic from a short-term perspective but may impair the long-term health
of the organization,’ says Jeffrey Evans, president of the New York Society of Security Analysts.
Consider a common decision that executives make regarding investment in human capital. Compensation,
training, and other related costs are expensed in the current period. Executives focused on quarterly
financial numbers have an incentive to forego labor-related investment in order to enhance the quarterly
financial results, even though the disinvestment may be detrimental to the long-term health of the organization
(Laverty, 1996). The purpose of this study is to provide evidence on the debate by examining the
use of performance measures in executive bonus compensation and determining whether firms that rely
heavily on labor to sustain its operations supplement traditional financial measures with non-financial
measures.
Executive bonus compensation provides an interesting setting for two reasons. First, it is a significant
part of executive pay.2 Second, it is the portion of executive compensation that is intended to motivate
managerial behaviors (Milkovich and Newman, 2002; Balkcom et al., 1997; Vancil, 1979). Traditionally,
compensation contracts have been written based on financial accounting measures, especially net income,
earnings per share, and return on assets (McKenzie and Shilling, 1998). The prevailing view is that
traditional financial measures encourage a short-term focus (Laverty, 1996) while non-financial measures
focus managers on making decisions that are healthier for the long run (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Thus,
the design of executive bonus compensation provides a rich setting to study the use of financial and
non-financial performance measures.
This study investigates the association between the use of performance measures and the reliance on
human capital. Labor, or human capital, is a critical type of intangible asset on which firms increasingly
rely (Lev, 2001). The term “human capital” has many different definitions. Economists consider human
talent and knowledge to be both a form of wealth and capital (Lev and Schwartz, 1971). Strategists define
strategic human capital as the portion of theworkforce that helps the firm sustain its competitive advantage
(Barney and Wright, 1998). The broadest definition of human capital and one found in the organizational
behavior literature is that it is the knowledge and/or skills possessed by the firm’s workforce (Lev, 2001;
Barney, 1991; Becker et al., 2001). Kaplan and Norton (1996, p. 6) state,
Now all employees must contribute value by what they know and by the information they can
provide. Investing in, managing, and exploiting the knowledge of every employee have become
critical to the success of information age companies.
In accordance with the latter line of research discussed above, I define human capital as the firm’s
workforce (i.e., the value contributed through the workforce’s contribution via skills and knowledge).
I also investigate an important contextual factor that may influence the relation between the use of
performance measures and the reliance on human capital—the firm’s design of its pay structure.
I draw on both economic theory (i.e., the informativeness principle) and social psychology theory (i.e.,
equity theory) to develop hypotheses. Agency theory embraces rational choice models; research often
investigates how performance measures can be used to more closely align employee actions with the
objectives of owners (Ittner et al., 1997). However, employees work in a social environment and “one’s
actions frequently and unavoidably shape, and are shaped by, the actions of others” (Sprinkle, 2003, p.
295). In this setting, agency theory generally disregards effects from salary and bonus apportionment;
however, since research shows that matters of equity are important to employees (Cowherd and Levine,
1992), incorporating both theories allows me to undertake a more complete investigation of the use of
performance measures. Indeed, Sprinkle (2003) calls for research that incorporates the apportionment of
rewards on performance-based contracts.
Ittner et al. (1997) use the informativeness principle as the basis of an investigation of the use of
performance measures inCEObonus compensation. They argue that traditional financial measures may be
appropriate for CEOs in firms focused on cost minimization; however, for CEOs in firms following either
a quality or an innovation-oriented strategy, non-financial measures will provide incremental information
regarding the firm’s long-term strategic objectives and help better align interests within the firm. Extending
this, I rely on the informativeness principle to argue that the use of non-financial information will provide
relevant information incremental to that provided by traditional financial measures when the firm relies
on human capital. I then draw on equity theory, which predicts that employees’ behaviors and attitudes
are negatively affected when they perceive inequity in the firm’s pay structure. Sprinkle (2003) notes that
issues of fairness and equity may well influence contracting. In my setting, it is likely that the perception
of (a lack of) fairness will (exacerbate) mitigate moral hazard issues. I argue, therefore, that the association
between the likelihood of using non-financial measures in bonus compensation and the use of human
capital will depend on the design of the firm’s pay structure.
Using disclosure information from the proxy statements of 177 firms, I classify the use of information in
bonus compensation into two categories: (1) firms that emphasize financial measures versus (2) firms that
use both financial and non-financial measures. Using a cross-sectional, binary logistic model I find that
the likelihood of using both financial and non-financial measures is increasing in labor intensity3 and that
the relation is more positive when the firm employs a hierarchical pay structure. This finding supports
the argument that the pay structure moderates the association between the use of human capital and
the use of non-financial measures in executive bonus compensation. Thus, the incremental information
content of non-financial measures is important in the monitoring and control process in labor-intensive
firms. I extend the analysis by subdividing the two broad categories of performance measures into four
categories characterized as firms that rely on: (1) financial information only, (2) financial and nonfinancial
information, but a financial threshold must be met, (3) financial and non-financial information
is a contextual factor that probably influences or moderates the relation between the use of performance
measures in compensation and reliance on human capital.
2.2. The moderating effect of pay structure
Compensation structures range from flat, narrow pay structures to very wide pay structures identified
by a large gap between the lowest and highest paid employees in the firm. These structures are known
as egalitarian (e.g., small gap in pay) and hierarchical structures (e.g., large gap in pay), respectively
(Milkovich and Newman, 2002). Egalitarian structures, as compared to hierarchical structures, are characterized
by fewer pay levels within the firm, and less difference in pay both between the lower echelon
employees and higher echelon executives, and between adjacent pay levels (Bloom, 1999; Milkovich and
Newman, 2002). The human resource literature has studied either the number of pay levels within a firm
or the spread of pay between the top and bottom of the firm (e.g., Bloom, 1999). Similar to Bloom (1999),
this study foc
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Human capital, pay structure, and the use of performancemeasures in bonus compensationSally K. Widener ∗Rice University, Jones Graduate School of Business, Room 331 - MS 531, 6100 Main Street,Houston, TX 77005-1892, USAReceived 10 March 2004; accepted 4 June 2005AbstractTraditional financial measures have been criticized for lacking relevance in today’s economy where firms areincreasingly competing with intangible assets. However, perhaps this criticism is not detrimental to firms if theytake actions to supplement the information contained in financial measures. Thus, it is important to explore whetherand when firms recognize this potential deficiency and take action to acquire the appropriate information. Thisstudy hypothesizes that two human resource variables, reliance on human capital and the firm’s pay structure, areassociated with the use of non-financial measures in top managers’ bonus compensation contracts since they provideinformation incremental to that provided by traditional financial measures. Using archival data from 177 firms, Iestimate binary and multi-response ordered logit models. The binary logit model provides evidence that laborintensivefirms have a higher probability of placing emphasis on non-financial measures (along with traditionalfinancial measures) and a lower probability of relying solely on traditional financial measures. Moreover, thisrelationship is moderated by the firm’s pay structure. Analysis shows that the relationship is stronger in firms thatemploy a hierarchical pay structure. Furthermore, the multi-response logit model extends these finding by showingthat these firms also have a higher probability of relying on human resource measures.1. IntroductionExecutive compensation provokes debate on many fronts,1 one of which is that emphasis on financialmeasures leads executives to focus on the short-term. Stone (Business Week, December 23, 2002)summarizes the issue by saying,The primary problem in Corporate America is not with investors’ short-term focus on quarterlyresults, but with management’s desire to achieve short-term goals because of their impact on executivecompensation. ‘With the obsessive focus on quarterly numbers, management is motivated tomake decisions that are pragmatic from a short-term perspective but may impair the long-term healthof the organization,’ says Jeffrey Evans, president of the New York Society of Security Analysts.Consider a common decision that executives make regarding investment in human capital. Compensation,training, and other related costs are expensed in the current period. Executives focused on quarterlyfinancial numbers have an incentive to forego labor-related investment in order to enhance the quarterlyfinancial results, even though the disinvestment may be detrimental to the long-term health of the organization(Laverty, 1996). The purpose of this study is to provide evidence on the debate by examining theuse of performance measures in executive bonus compensation and determining whether firms that relyheavily on labor to sustain its operations supplement traditional financial measures with non-financialmeasures.Executive bonus compensation provides an interesting setting for two reasons. First, it is a significantpart of executive pay.2 Second, it is the portion of executive compensation that is intended to motivatemanagerial behaviors (Milkovich and Newman, 2002; Balkcom et al., 1997; Vancil, 1979). Traditionally,compensation contracts have been written based on financial accounting measures, especially net income,earnings per share, and return on assets (McKenzie and Shilling, 1998). The prevailing view is thattraditional financial measures encourage a short-term focus (Laverty, 1996) while non-financial measuresfocus managers on making decisions that are healthier for the long run (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Thus,the design of executive bonus compensation provides a rich setting to study the use of financial andnon-financial performance measures.This study investigates the association between the use of performance measures and the reliance onhuman capital. Labor, or human capital, is a critical type of intangible asset on which firms increasinglyrely (Lev, 2001). The term “human capital” has many different definitions. Economists consider humantalent and knowledge to be both a form of wealth and capital (Lev and Schwartz, 1971). Strategists definestrategic human capital as the portion of theworkforce that helps the firm sustain its competitive advantage(Barney and Wright, 1998). The broadest definition of human capital and one found in the organizationalbehavior literature is that it is the knowledge and/or skills possessed by the firm’s workforce (Lev, 2001;Barney, 1991; Becker et al., 2001). Kaplan and Norton (1996, p. 6) state,Now all employees must contribute value by what they know and by the information they canprovide. Investing in, managing, and exploiting the knowledge of every employee have becomecritical to the success of information age companies.In accordance with the latter line of research discussed above, I define human capital as the firm’sworkforce (i.e., the value contributed through the workforce’s contribution via skills and knowledge).I also investigate an important contextual factor that may influence the relation between the use ofperformance measures and the reliance on human capital—the firm’s design of its pay structure.I draw on both economic theory (i.e., the informativeness principle) and social psychology theory (i.e.,equity theory) to develop hypotheses. Agency theory embraces rational choice models; research ofteninvestigates how performance measures can be used to more closely align employee actions with theobjectives of owners (Ittner et al., 1997). However, employees work in a social environment and “one’sactions frequently and unavoidably shape, and are shaped by, the actions of others” (Sprinkle, 2003, p.
295). In this setting, agency theory generally disregards effects from salary and bonus apportionment;
however, since research shows that matters of equity are important to employees (Cowherd and Levine,
1992), incorporating both theories allows me to undertake a more complete investigation of the use of
performance measures. Indeed, Sprinkle (2003) calls for research that incorporates the apportionment of
rewards on performance-based contracts.
Ittner et al. (1997) use the informativeness principle as the basis of an investigation of the use of
performance measures inCEObonus compensation. They argue that traditional financial measures may be
appropriate for CEOs in firms focused on cost minimization; however, for CEOs in firms following either
a quality or an innovation-oriented strategy, non-financial measures will provide incremental information
regarding the firm’s long-term strategic objectives and help better align interests within the firm. Extending
this, I rely on the informativeness principle to argue that the use of non-financial information will provide
relevant information incremental to that provided by traditional financial measures when the firm relies
on human capital. I then draw on equity theory, which predicts that employees’ behaviors and attitudes
are negatively affected when they perceive inequity in the firm’s pay structure. Sprinkle (2003) notes that
issues of fairness and equity may well influence contracting. In my setting, it is likely that the perception
of (a lack of) fairness will (exacerbate) mitigate moral hazard issues. I argue, therefore, that the association
between the likelihood of using non-financial measures in bonus compensation and the use of human
capital will depend on the design of the firm’s pay structure.
Using disclosure information from the proxy statements of 177 firms, I classify the use of information in
bonus compensation into two categories: (1) firms that emphasize financial measures versus (2) firms that
use both financial and non-financial measures. Using a cross-sectional, binary logistic model I find that
the likelihood of using both financial and non-financial measures is increasing in labor intensity3 and that
the relation is more positive when the firm employs a hierarchical pay structure. This finding supports
the argument that the pay structure moderates the association between the use of human capital and
the use of non-financial measures in executive bonus compensation. Thus, the incremental information
content of non-financial measures is important in the monitoring and control process in labor-intensive
firms. I extend the analysis by subdividing the two broad categories of performance measures into four
categories characterized as firms that rely on: (1) financial information only, (2) financial and nonfinancial
information, but a financial threshold must be met, (3) financial and non-financial information
is a contextual factor that probably influences or moderates the relation between the use of performance
measures in compensation and reliance on human capital.
2.2. The moderating effect of pay structure
Compensation structures range from flat, narrow pay structures to very wide pay structures identified
by a large gap between the lowest and highest paid employees in the firm. These structures are known
as egalitarian (e.g., small gap in pay) and hierarchical structures (e.g., large gap in pay), respectively
(Milkovich and Newman, 2002). Egalitarian structures, as compared to hierarchical structures, are characterized
by fewer pay levels within the firm, and less difference in pay both between the lower echelon
employees and higher echelon executives, and between adjacent pay levels (Bloom, 1999; Milkovich and
Newman, 2002). The human resource literature has studied either the number of pay levels within a firm
or the spread of pay between the top and bottom of the firm (e.g., Bloom, 1999). Similar to Bloom (1999),
this study foc
295). In this setting, agency theory generally disregards effects from salary and bonus apportionment;
however, since research shows that matters of equity are important to employees (Cowherd and Levine,
1992), incorporating both theories allows me to undertake a more complete investigation of the use of
performance measures. Indeed, Sprinkle (2003) calls for research that incorporates the apportionment of
rewards on performance-based contracts.
Ittner et al. (1997) use the informativeness principle as the basis of an investigation of the use of
performance measures inCEObonus compensation. They argue that traditional financial measures may be
appropriate for CEOs in firms focused on cost minimization; however, for CEOs in firms following either
a quality or an innovation-oriented strategy, non-financial measures will provide incremental information
regarding the firm’s long-term strategic objectives and help better align interests within the firm. Extending
this, I rely on the informativeness principle to argue that the use of non-financial information will provide
relevant information incremental to that provided by traditional financial measures when the firm relies
on human capital. I then draw on equity theory, which predicts that employees’ behaviors and attitudes
are negatively affected when they perceive inequity in the firm’s pay structure. Sprinkle (2003) notes that
issues of fairness and equity may well influence contracting. In my setting, it is likely that the perception
of (a lack of) fairness will (exacerbate) mitigate moral hazard issues. I argue, therefore, that the association
between the likelihood of using non-financial measures in bonus compensation and the use of human
capital will depend on the design of the firm’s pay structure.
Using disclosure information from the proxy statements of 177 firms, I classify the use of information in
bonus compensation into two categories: (1) firms that emphasize financial measures versus (2) firms that
use both financial and non-financial measures. Using a cross-sectional, binary logistic model I find that
the likelihood of using both financial and non-financial measures is increasing in labor intensity3 and that
the relation is more positive when the firm employs a hierarchical pay structure. This finding supports
the argument that the pay structure moderates the association between the use of human capital and
the use of non-financial measures in executive bonus compensation. Thus, the incremental information
content of non-financial measures is important in the monitoring and control process in labor-intensive
firms. I extend the analysis by subdividing the two broad categories of performance measures into four
categories characterized as firms that rely on: (1) financial information only, (2) financial and nonfinancial
information, but a financial threshold must be met, (3) financial and non-financial information
is a contextual factor that probably influences or moderates the relation between the use of performance
measures in compensation and reliance on human capital.
2.2. The moderating effect of pay structure
Compensation structures range from flat, narrow pay structures to very wide pay structures identified
by a large gap between the lowest and highest paid employees in the firm. These structures are known
as egalitarian (e.g., small gap in pay) and hierarchical structures (e.g., large gap in pay), respectively
(Milkovich and Newman, 2002). Egalitarian structures, as compared to hierarchical structures, are characterized
by fewer pay levels within the firm, and less difference in pay both between the lower echelon
employees and higher echelon executives, and between adjacent pay levels (Bloom, 1999; Milkovich and
Newman, 2002). The human resource literature has studied either the number of pay levels within a firm
or the spread of pay between the top and bottom of the firm (e.g., Bloom, 1999). Similar to Bloom (1999),
this study foc
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โบนัสแซลลี่ K . ขยายออก∗
มหาวิทยาลัยข้าว โจนส์บัณฑิตวิทยาลัยธุรกิจ ห้อง 331 - นางสาว 531 6100 ถนน
, , ฮูสตัน , เท็กซัส 77005-1892 USA
ได้รับ 10 มีนาคม 2004 ; ยอมรับ 4 มิถุนายน 2005
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ที่ บริษัทขึ้นประชันกับสินทรัพย์ไม่มีตัวตน . แต่บางที การวิจารณ์นี้ไม่ได้เป็นอันตรายต่อ บริษัท หากพวกเขา
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hypothesizes ที่ 2 ทรัพยากรมนุษย์ด้านการพึ่งพาทุนมนุษย์และโครงสร้างการจ่ายของบริษัท ,
มีความสัมพันธ์กับการใช้มาตรการทางการเงินในผู้จัดการด้านบนโบนัสค่าตอบแทนสัญญาตั้งแต่พวกเขาให้
ข้อมูลเพิ่ม โดยมาตรการทางการเงินแบบดั้งเดิม โดยใช้ข้อมูลจดหมายเหตุจาก 177 บริษัทผม
กะไบนารีและการตอบสนองคำสั่งแบบจำลองโลจิตหลาย .แบบจำลองโลจิตแบบมีหลักฐานว่า บริษัท laborintensive
มีความน่าจะเป็นที่สูงขึ้นของการวางเน้นมาตรการทางการเงิน ( ควบคู่กับมาตรการทางการเงินแบบดั้งเดิม
) และความน่าจะเป็นกว่า อาศัยแค่มาตรการทางการเงินแบบดั้งเดิม นอกจากนี้ ความสัมพันธ์นี้
คือมีโครงสร้างค่าจ้างของบริษัท การวิเคราะห์แสดงให้เห็นว่าความสัมพันธ์ที่แข็งแกร่งในอุตสาหกรรม
ใช้โครงสร้างการจ่ายแบบลำดับชั้น . นอกจากนี้ , โดยใช้การตอบสนองหลายรูปแบบขยายผล โดยการแสดง
ที่ บริษัท เหล่านี้ยังมีความน่าจะเป็นที่สูงขึ้นของการพึ่งพามาตรการทรัพยากรมนุษย์
1 ค่าตอบแทนผู้บริหารแนะนำให้เกิดการอภิปรายในหลาย fronts
1 หนึ่งซึ่งคือ เน้นมาตรการทางการเงิน
นำผู้บริหารเน้นระยะสั้น หิน ( สัปดาห์ธุรกิจ23 ธันวาคม , 2002 )
สรุปปัญหาว่า ปัญหาหลักใน บริษัท อเมริกาไม่ใช่นักลงทุนโฟกัสระยะสั้นผลรายไตรมาส
, แต่ต้องการการจัดการ เพื่อให้บรรลุเป้าหมายระยะสั้น เนื่องจาก ผลกระทบต่อค่าตอบแทนผู้บริหาร
กับการโฟกัสหมกมุ่นในไตรมาสตัวเลขการจัดการเป็นแรงบันดาลใจ
การตัดสินใจที่จะปฏิบัติจากมุมมองระยะสั้น แต่อาจมีผลกระทบในระยะยาวสุขภาพ
ขององค์กร ' กล่าวว่า เจฟฟรีย์อีแวนส์ ประธานของนิวยอร์กสมาคมนักวิเคราะห์การรักษาความปลอดภัย พิจารณาตัดสินใจร่วมกัน
ผู้บริหารให้เกี่ยวกับการลงทุนในทุนมนุษย์ การชดเชย ,
การฝึกอบรมและค่าใช้จ่ายอื่น ๆที่เกี่ยวข้องกับ expensed ในช่วงปัจจุบันผู้บริหารเน้นตัวเลขการเงินไตรมาส
มีแรงจูงใจที่จะสละแรงงานที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการลงทุน เพื่อเพิ่มผลทางการเงินไตรมาส
ถึงแม้ disinvestment อาจเป็นอันตรายกับสุขภาพในระยะยาวของ
องค์กร ( Laverty , 1996 ) การวิจัยนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อให้หลักฐานในการอภิปราย โดยการตรวจสอบ
ใช้ประสิทธิภาพของมาตรการในการชดเชยโบนัสผู้บริหาร และกำหนดว่า บริษัท ที่อาศัย
อย่างมากในแรงงานหนุนเสริมการดำเนินงานของมาตรการทางการเงินแบบดั้งเดิม ด้วยมาตรการทางการเงิน
.
ค่าตอบแทนโบนัสผู้บริหารมีการตั้งค่าที่น่าสนใจสำหรับสองเหตุผล ตอนแรก มันเป็นส่วนหนึ่งที่สำคัญของการบริหารค่าตอบแทน
2 วินาที
โบนัสแซลลี่ K . ขยายออก∗
มหาวิทยาลัยข้าว โจนส์บัณฑิตวิทยาลัยธุรกิจ ห้อง 331 - นางสาว 531 6100 ถนน
, , ฮูสตัน , เท็กซัส 77005-1892 USA
ได้รับ 10 มีนาคม 2004 ; ยอมรับ 4 มิถุนายน 2005
มาตรการทางการเงินแบบดั้งเดิมเวกเตอร์ ได้รับการวิพากษ์วิจารณ์ไม่มีความเกี่ยวข้องในวันนี้เศรษฐกิจมี
ที่ บริษัทขึ้นประชันกับสินทรัพย์ไม่มีตัวตน . แต่บางที การวิจารณ์นี้ไม่ได้เป็นอันตรายต่อ บริษัท หากพวกเขา
ดำเนินการเพื่อเสริมข้อมูลที่อยู่ในมาตรการทางการเงิน ดังนั้น , มันเป็นสิ่งสำคัญที่จะสำรวจว่า
เมื่อบริษัทจำขาดศักยภาพนี้และดำเนินการที่จะได้รับข้อมูลที่เหมาะสม การศึกษา
hypothesizes ที่ 2 ทรัพยากรมนุษย์ด้านการพึ่งพาทุนมนุษย์และโครงสร้างการจ่ายของบริษัท ,
มีความสัมพันธ์กับการใช้มาตรการทางการเงินในผู้จัดการด้านบนโบนัสค่าตอบแทนสัญญาตั้งแต่พวกเขาให้
ข้อมูลเพิ่ม โดยมาตรการทางการเงินแบบดั้งเดิม โดยใช้ข้อมูลจดหมายเหตุจาก 177 บริษัทผม
กะไบนารีและการตอบสนองคำสั่งแบบจำลองโลจิตหลาย .แบบจำลองโลจิตแบบมีหลักฐานว่า บริษัท laborintensive
มีความน่าจะเป็นที่สูงขึ้นของการวางเน้นมาตรการทางการเงิน ( ควบคู่กับมาตรการทางการเงินแบบดั้งเดิม
) และความน่าจะเป็นกว่า อาศัยแค่มาตรการทางการเงินแบบดั้งเดิม นอกจากนี้ ความสัมพันธ์นี้
คือมีโครงสร้างค่าจ้างของบริษัท การวิเคราะห์แสดงให้เห็นว่าความสัมพันธ์ที่แข็งแกร่งในอุตสาหกรรม
ใช้โครงสร้างการจ่ายแบบลำดับชั้น . นอกจากนี้ , โดยใช้การตอบสนองหลายรูปแบบขยายผล โดยการแสดง
ที่ บริษัท เหล่านี้ยังมีความน่าจะเป็นที่สูงขึ้นของการพึ่งพามาตรการทรัพยากรมนุษย์
1 ค่าตอบแทนผู้บริหารแนะนำให้เกิดการอภิปรายในหลาย fronts
1 หนึ่งซึ่งคือ เน้นมาตรการทางการเงิน
นำผู้บริหารเน้นระยะสั้น หิน ( สัปดาห์ธุรกิจ23 ธันวาคม , 2002 )
สรุปปัญหาว่า ปัญหาหลักใน บริษัท อเมริกาไม่ใช่นักลงทุนโฟกัสระยะสั้นผลรายไตรมาส
, แต่ต้องการการจัดการ เพื่อให้บรรลุเป้าหมายระยะสั้น เนื่องจาก ผลกระทบต่อค่าตอบแทนผู้บริหาร
กับการโฟกัสหมกมุ่นในไตรมาสตัวเลขการจัดการเป็นแรงบันดาลใจ
การตัดสินใจที่จะปฏิบัติจากมุมมองระยะสั้น แต่อาจมีผลกระทบในระยะยาวสุขภาพ
ขององค์กร ' กล่าวว่า เจฟฟรีย์อีแวนส์ ประธานของนิวยอร์กสมาคมนักวิเคราะห์การรักษาความปลอดภัย พิจารณาตัดสินใจร่วมกัน
ผู้บริหารให้เกี่ยวกับการลงทุนในทุนมนุษย์ การชดเชย ,
การฝึกอบรมและค่าใช้จ่ายอื่น ๆที่เกี่ยวข้องกับ expensed ในช่วงปัจจุบันผู้บริหารเน้นตัวเลขการเงินไตรมาส
มีแรงจูงใจที่จะสละแรงงานที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการลงทุน เพื่อเพิ่มผลทางการเงินไตรมาส
ถึงแม้ disinvestment อาจเป็นอันตรายกับสุขภาพในระยะยาวของ
องค์กร ( Laverty , 1996 ) การวิจัยนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อให้หลักฐานในการอภิปราย โดยการตรวจสอบ
ใช้ประสิทธิภาพของมาตรการในการชดเชยโบนัสผู้บริหาร และกำหนดว่า บริษัท ที่อาศัย
อย่างมากในแรงงานหนุนเสริมการดำเนินงานของมาตรการทางการเงินแบบดั้งเดิม ด้วยมาตรการทางการเงิน
.
ค่าตอบแทนโบนัสผู้บริหารมีการตั้งค่าที่น่าสนใจสำหรับสองเหตุผล ตอนแรก มันเป็นส่วนหนึ่งที่สำคัญของการบริหารค่าตอบแทน
2 วินาที
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- the brink and beyond
- 请排队作为一片
- รับประทานอาหารว่าง
- Official control number
- on their first written demand, all that
- มารับสินค้า
- please let me know your coming news
- For a perfect gas, the internalenergy is
- Explain whether an error has occurred if
- แอ๊บพูบ
- Official control number
- เพื่อให้ประเพณีเก่าแก่ได้คงอยู่
- ฉันไม่รู้เขาคิดยังไง
- รับทราบครับ
- If we do not understand the lesson. We c
- That morning the villagers flocked to th
- Be aware of the risk, but don't avoid th
- When he was young Van Gogh spent a lot o
- รบกวน
- Effects of plant-growth-promoting microo
- Will work on the rate and revert
- มีความสะดวกสบายในการใช้งาน
- Now i need to think of a reason so that
- ซอยศึกษาวิทยา
