Second, in general, policymakers tend to maximize their own values along with key client groups and are not motivated to act on the basis of societal preferences or develop policies to maximize marginal social benefits over costs. Over the past several decades, prospects for substantial anti drug enforcement money quickly turned the chance for a coordinated policy into a gold rush, resulting in predictable turf battles between the US Customs Service and the Guard, both of which then wanted new radar planes from the Senate (Brinkley 1986). Many of these turf battles now continue within the new structure of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thus, any technical difficulties in defining the drug policy problem were overwhelmed by bureaucratic in fighting related to available funding. Failure to control the institutional environment through strong policy leadership resulted in mis definition of the problem, which predictably has led to continued enforcement failures. Institutional inertia ensured that despite evidence of policy failure, this definition remained constant, driving both future drug policies and expenditures. The current climate of revenue scarcity, increasing costs of incarceration,