In the course of committing a theft the accused, who had broken into a house occupied by a woman of 73 years of age, attacked her with his fists. He struck her, and kicked her in the face. From those injuries, although they could have been inflicted with a moderate degree of violence, she died. He was convicted of capital murder. The trial judge directed the jury that malice aforethought would be implied if the victim were killed by the voluntary act of the accused done with intent to cause her grievous bodily harm. On appeal against conviction on the ground that the direction was wrong in law in view of Homicide Act 1957 s 1(1): Held the conviction should stand because s 1(1) did not abolish the doctrine of implied malice, viz, that malice aforethought may be implied from the voluntary act of an accused inflicting grievous bodily harm on the deceased causing her death; but s 1(1) did abolish the doctrine of constructive malice, viz, that the causing of death in the course of committing some felony of violence (eg, rape) other than that which resulted in the killing amounted to murder, and, although in the present case deceased’s death had been caused in the furtherance of the crime of theft, yet there had been also the inflicting of grievous bodily harm from which malice aforethought, essential to the crime of murder, might rightly be implied.