Because the effect of union strength and the vote share of the left are conditional
on each other in the model for inflationary crises, Figure 1 plots the conditional
probability of an inflationary crisis across levels of left strength and low and high
levels of unionization. The results provide evidence of a fascinating dynamic
whereby the electoral strength of the left increases the probability of an inflationary crisis only when unions are weak. One case in our data that illustrates this dynamic
is Peru, which suffered a prolonged hyperinflationary crisis in the late 1980s when
center-left and leftist parties were electorally powerful but their labor union base had
been seriously weakened by a decade of economic decline. In contrast, the
probability of a crisis declines when a powerful electoral left has close ties to
strong labor unions that are able to moderate workers’ demands and institutionalize
bargaining over distributive issues. A quintessential case of this dynamic in our data
is Venezuela, which has a history of moderate left-wing parties (pre-Chávez),
relatively strong unions, and comparatively restrained monetary policy. A related
story can be told temporally in Argentina, where inflationary crises have not
occurred when the labor-based Peronists have been at their strongest; in contrast, the
country’s most serious inflationary crises occurred when the Peronists were
electorally weak and out of power
Because the effect of union strength and the vote share of the left are conditionalon each other in the model for inflationary crises, Figure 1 plots the conditionalprobability of an inflationary crisis across levels of left strength and low and highlevels of unionization. The results provide evidence of a fascinating dynamicwhereby the electoral strength of the left increases the probability of an inflationary crisis only when unions are weak. One case in our data that illustrates this dynamicis Peru, which suffered a prolonged hyperinflationary crisis in the late 1980s whencenter-left and leftist parties were electorally powerful but their labor union base hadbeen seriously weakened by a decade of economic decline. In contrast, theprobability of a crisis declines when a powerful electoral left has close ties tostrong labor unions that are able to moderate workers’ demands and institutionalizebargaining over distributive issues. A quintessential case of this dynamic in our datais Venezuela, which has a history of moderate left-wing parties (pre-Chávez),relatively strong unions, and comparatively restrained monetary policy. A relatedstory can be told temporally in Argentina, where inflationary crises have notoccurred when the labor-based Peronists have been at their strongest; in contrast, thecountry’s most serious inflationary crises occurred when the Peronists wereelectorally weak and out of power
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