The Master was negligent in the following respects:
He took the ship between the Seven Stones and the Scillies, rather than between the
Seven Stones and Land’s End. Despite the presence offishing vessels and nets, he
kept the ship on automatic steering, failing to put her in hand steering.
He failed to reduce speed at any time prior to the stranding and especially at 08.40
when he reckoned he was nearer to the Seven Stones than he had previously thought
and when a turn to 325” was prevented by the presence of a fishing vessel on his port
side. He had not established any regular or routine practice for the operation of the
steering wheel selection lever.’ ’
In addition the Master (Captain Rugiati) had not taken into account the strong current, so
the report goes on:
“It is interesting to note that Capt Rugiati was not the only seafarer to be deceived
by the strong northeasterly set which put the ‘Torrey Canyon’ further to the north
and east than he expected. The strong set is a well known phenomenon at certain
times of the year. It runs between Ushant and the Scillies and has accountedfor many
of the 257 known wrecks on the troublesome rocks and islands of the Scillies.”
“The ‘Torrey Canyon’ had good visibility, modern navigational aids, daylight radar
and there was no gale. Small wonder that the Board of Investigation found that only
human error was to blame.”
This is one of the many examples in which human error can be isolated as the main cause
of a major marine casualty. Another more recent example is the stranding of the 125,000
m3 LNG Carrier ‘El Paso Paul Kayser’, which stranded on a pinnacle of the La Perla Shoal
in the Strait of Gibraltar on 29 June 1979. After a careful analysis it was concluded that the
following lessons could be learned (Chadwick, 1984) :
“ 1. The preparation and execution of a passage plan is essentialfor safe navigation.
2. Adequate numbers of men on the bridge do not make an adequate bridge organisation.
The bridge team must actively support the conning ofJicer.
3. Total reliance on a CAS radar can place a vessel at great risk.”
The list of “famous” accidents in which human factors and human errors play dominant
role can be extended with accidents as those with the ‘Exxon Valdez’ and the ‘Harald of
Free Enterprise’.
In order to reduce the probability of such accidents research and training is required. This
is the area in which the Maritime Simulation Centre Netherlands (MSCN) is active. In the
following chapters an overview is provided of activities in the areas of training and research with respect to nautical safety and efficiency.