Austin's definition of law that it is a "command given by a superior an inferior which forms the basis of his theory of sovereignty, cannot Be accepted as a simple truth. Laski says that to think of law as simply a command is even for the jurist "to strain definition to the verge of decency." yovereign can ignore the existence afcustomary law which has grown through usage in every country. Customary law is not the fiat of a determinate superior and in earlier stages of society laws were seldom, if ever, positive commandsh of a sovereign. Ranjit Singh, to agains quote Maine ''never issued a command ap which Austin would call a law. He never made a law and never did or could have dreamed of changing the civil rules under which his subjects lived. Even a sovereign legislative assembly, like the British Parliament, dare nof pass a law which aims to violate the established customs and traditions of the country. MacIver has aptly said that "State has little power to make custo and perhaps less to destroy it, although indirectly it influences customs by changing the conditions out of which they spring 36 Custom is not a deliberate statute; it is the outcome of ages and even an autocrat must be the guardian and servant of customs, if he desires to obviate the possiblities of revolution. For, custom, when attacked, attacks law in turn, attacks not onl the particular law which opposes it, but what is more vital, the spirit of law-abidingness Austin himself was fully conscious of the force behind customs and maintained, "whatever the sovereign permits, he commands." Austin argued that customs, unless enforced by courts of justice, are merely "positive morality" enforced by opinions. But as soon as courts of justice enforce them, they become commands of the sovereign, conveyed through the judges who are his delegates