Over many meetings, the two sides came to a rough agreement. Basically, Bear was willing to promise to keep clearing for Long-Term as long as the hedge fund kept 1.5 billion on call at Bear. Though this was acceptable to Long-Term, the partners wanted to resolve some other issues before they signed; chiefly, and with uncanny prescience, they were anxious to protect Long-Term's flexibility during a crisis. Hilibrand, having read reports of the Askin debacle, realized that if Long-Term ever did stumble, Bear would be able to force a liquidation, perhaps at fire-sale prices. Bear would also be in a position to divulge Long-Term’s positions, potentially setting off a wave of selling. Thus, Hilibrand wanted to nail down Long-Term’s right to hold Bea r liable for any abuses, such as breaching Long-Term's confidentiality.