Place is central to human existence. It is one of the means by which
we structure our lives. Place is often itself an event, a center of meaning.
Consider the following places: Ground Zero, the White House, the National
Mall, Tiananmen Square, and Auschwitz. These are not mere locales or
sites. They are not undifferentiated spaces. They are all dynamic places,
expressive aspects of cultures. In their unique ways, these places say
something about politics, pain, triumph, and loss. They are repositories of
memory, conveyors of rhetoric. The experience of being in these places is
very different from the experience of being elsewhere.
Contrast these opening observations regarding certain meaningful
places with the current First Amendment conception of “place.” To the
extent that “place” enters constitutional discourse at all, it is as nothing
more than a resource, a parcel of property, or an inert element of the
expressive background.1 Even the most sacred place does nothing; it says
nothing. The current First Amendment conception of “place” as inert res is
a distinctly lawyerly one.2 It does not appreciate the importance of place to
expressive and associative activity. It does not adequately take into
account that where a speaker or group of speakers is placed profoundly
impacts expressive message, persuasive efficacy, participation, and
symbolic meaning.