Of pension audit clients, on pension plan audit fees. To control for other factors which have been shown to influence pension plan audit fees, and thereby test the incremental impact of market share on audit fees, the number of pension clients variable was introduced into the pension plan audit fee model developed by cullinan (1997). This audit fee model suggests that a pension plan’s audit fee is a function of both plan and auditor characteristics based on four categories: size/activity, opinion, market factors and risk variables.
With higher levels of activity and size, greater amounts of audit work are expected to be required, resulting in a higher fee. Size is measured by the log of total plan assets. Activity measures include total plan contributins and participants (both scaled by total assets), and a measure of portfolio turnover calculated as assets sold during the tear divided by average total assets. For all of these size and activity variables, Cullinan (1997) hypothesized a positive relationship between the variables and the audit fee.
Based on previous audit fee research, Cullinan (1997) included an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the plan received an unqualified opinion, and 0 if the audit opinion were qualified. This opinion variable was included based on the notion that an audit resulting in a qualified opinion will be more costly than an audit resulting in an unqualified opinion. Market factor variables included in the cullinan (1997) model included big 6 status of the auditor and an indicator variable representing whether there had been an auditor change. Directional expectations for these variables were not developed due to the differing rationales regarding their potential impact on audit fees.
Risk variables representing potential audit complexity and client financial risk were also included in the cullinan (1997) pensionaudit fee model. The percentage of plan assets in joint ventures and real estate (termed “hard-to-audit” assets) was included in the audit fee model as one measure of audit complexity. Legalfees (scaled by assets) were also included as a complexity measure based on the likely correlation between complex plan transactions and the plan’s legal fee. Plan amendments and whether the plan was a unionized plan were also included as measures of audit complexity in the cullinan (1997) model. For all of the complexity variables, higher levels of complexity were expected to result in higher audit fees. Financial risk was measured based on plan funding, defined as total plan assets divided by the plan’s actuarial liability, with audit fees.