The paper argues that multinationals which engage in transactions in countries with the reputation of being corrupt adjust their market entry tactics according to the host country and play entirely by the local rules of the game. As Siemens alone has been investigated by authorities in approximately 25 different countries, the authors chose Siemens AG as a case and assessed its behavior over four countries belonging to different types of corruption control environments – the US, Italy, Russia and China. They do not claim to assess whether and if Siemens’ tactics have changed since it had been prosecuted and fined by the US and some other countries. However, the authors argue that if a country’s overall corruption has not changed, such multinationals are likely to search for even more camouflaged means of participating in corrupt “markets.” Stopping to do business in those countries, as an alternative strategy, hardly seems to happen. Persistent investors in notoriously corrupt countries thus become subsidizers of a vicious circle of poor governance.