the risk-free interest rate, real interest rate rigidity acts as an automatic macro-prudential stabi-lizer. This is because higher debt today associated with lower interest rates (relative to the flexibleinterest rate case) is offset by lower interest repayments, resulting in higher net worth and lowerprobability of a crisis in the future. In contrast, when the risk-free rate is hit by a negative shock,real interest rate rigidity leads to a relatively higher crisis probability through the same mecha-nisms working in reverse (borrowing and consumption are relatively lower today, but they areoffset by relatively higher debt service tomorrow, resulting in lower future net-worth and highercrisis probability).Second, we show that, when the interest rate is the only policy instrument to address both themacroeconomic and the financial friction, and a shock that lowers interest rates hits the economy,a policy trade-off emerges. This is because the two frictions require interventions of oppositedirection on the same instrument. Other instruments, however, may be at the policy-maker’s dis-posal in order to achieve and maintain financial stability. Our model shows that, when two instru-ments are available, this trade-off disappears and efficiency can be restored.Our analysis has interesting implications regarding the role of U.S. monetary policy in the run-up to the Great Recession. In a series of recent papers Taylor (2007, 2010) suggested that higherinterest rates in the 2002-2006 period would have reduced both the likelihood and the severityof the Great Recession. Our findings above support this argument only if we make the auxiliaryassumption that the policy authority seeks to address all distortions in the model with a singleinstrument, namely the policy interest rate. In contrast, when the policy authority has two differ-ent instruments, interest rates can be lowered as much as needed in response to a contractionaryshock without concerns for financial stability. This is consistent with the view of Bernanke (2010)that additional policy tools, to limit dangerous expansions in leverage, were needed to prevent theglobal financial crisis.