In the case of individual daily limits for mackerel stock, several elements have promoted non-compliant behavior from some vessel segments, following information derived from focus groups: (i) fishermen’s expert knowledge on good mackerel stock status, (ii) the high level competition between purse-seiners, trawlers, and even the artisanal fleet for the mackerel stock, (iii) the seasonal character of the fishery and, (iv) the low level first-sale prices. With the aim of achieving good results in terms of the sustainability of this fishery, a new complementary and coercive top-down management by the Spanish administration was introduced, namely, a reinforced control system at ports. Thus, compliance and sustainability are possible only under coercive management. For the anchovy stock, managed by individual daily limits, the purse seine fleet is the only one that targets anchovy, hence the lack of incentive to compete for the resource. In relation to the market, the Bay of Biscay anchovy enjoys a well established reputation among consumers; this seems to protect the price from competition from anchovy imports. Finally, this measure provides correct incentives and contributes to the fishery’s sustainability. In
the case of IQs for blue-fin tuna, the role of the PO is perceived by the sector as very positive, having contributed to the success of this management system. In spite of this,fishermen do not think this experience could be applied to other fisheries in the Basque Country. The fourth experience concerns ITQs for hake, megrim and angler fish. The offshore sector agrees with the ITQ system but claims that the roots of the sector’s problem can be found in the initial allocation of the national share by the European Commission. The failures of the relative stability principle are argued as one of the main reasons for fishermen’s behavior. Issues related to ITQ transfers among PO associates, among other issues, are organized through the PO concerned.